Sunday, May 22, 2011

Matrix 5 Extortionists - FBI Forensic Laboratories - Hidden Evidence - Bombardier Insiders - Degussa-Patented Anthrax - Sabotaged-Spore Powders

May 21, 2011

Dear Prime Minister Harper:

Did Trudeau-Marcy Matrix 5 hide Bombardier anthrax with FBI?

Abel Danger believes Crown Agents’ Sisters Lena Trudeau and Kristine Marcy ordered Matrix 5 extortionists to use the FBI forensic laboratories in Washington D.C. to hide evidence of a conspiracy by Bombardier insiders to spray Degussa-patented anthrax sabotage-spore powders over selected targets during the 911 attack on America.





Abel Danger Mischief Makers - Mistress of the Revels - 'Man-In-The-Middle' Attacks

http://groups.yahoo.com/group/hawkscafe/message/415

Trudeau procured Bombardier Matrix 5

Bombardier Matrix 5 procured anthrax tail cones

Marcy used Bombardier jets for Con Air 911

“[Bombardier tail-cone modifications procured for Lena Trudeau’s Privy Council associates by the homicidal pedophile and EW pilot Russell Williams, were allegedly intended for aerial spraying of anthrax sabotage-spore powder during the 911 attacks] In the 1980s, the Canadian Air Force purchased a number of CL600 Challenger Aircraft for VIP transport and electronic war fare. These aircrafts were certified to the Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) part 25. Specific CF requirements made it necessary to modify these aircrafts. Among other changes like avionics and wiring, cut-outs were made in the tailcone structure for an infrared sensor, a ram air intake, as well as a chaff dispenser. After the CF decided there was no further need to operate the CL600 Challenger aircraft, three CL600 aircrafts were sold to a private operator who contracted out the removal of the modifications installed by the CF. The contractor was tasked to re-certify these aircrafts to FAR 25. The cut-outs remaining after removal of the tailcone modifications were considered as damage and repair schemes had therefore been developed to re-establish the structural integrity of the original tailcones. Martec Limited was therefore tasked by the contractor to analyze the proposed repair schemes and to modify the repair schemes as required to ensure the structural integrity and durability of the repairs.”

“[Spoliation signature of Trudeau-Marcy Matrix 5] FBI lab reports on anthrax attacks suggest another miscue By Greg Gordon | McClatchy Newspapers Posted on Thursday, May 19, 2011

WASHINGTON — Buried in FBI laboratory reports about the anthrax mail attacks that killed five people in 2001 is data suggesting that a chemical may have been added to try to heighten the powder's potency, a move that some experts say exceeded the expertise of the presumed killer.

The lab data, contained in more than 9,000 pages of files that emerged a year after the Justice Department closed its inquiry and condemned the late Army microbiologist Bruce Ivins as the perpetrator, shows unusual levels of silicon and tin in anthrax powder from two of the five letters.

Those elements are found in compounds that could be used to weaponize the anthrax, enabling the lethal spores to float easily so they could be readily inhaled by the intended victims, scientists say.

The existence of the silicon-tin chemical signature offered investigators the possibility of tracing purchases of the more than 100 such chemical products available before the attacks, which might have produced hard evidence against Ivins or led the agency to the real culprit.

But the FBI lab reports released in late February give no hint that bureau agents tried to find the buyers of additives such as tin-catalyzed silicone polymers.

The apparent failure of the FBI to pursue this avenue of investigation raises the ominous possibility that the killer is still on the loose.

A McClatchy analysis of the records also shows that other key scientific questions were left unresolved and conflicting data wasn't sorted out when the FBI declared Ivins the killer shortly after his July 29, 2008, suicide.

One chemist at a national laboratory told McClatchy that the tin-silicone findings and the contradictory data should prompt a new round of testing on the anthrax powder.

A senior federal law enforcement official, who was made available only on the condition of anonymity, said the FBI had ordered exhaustive tests on the possible sources of silicon in the anthrax and concluded that it wasn't added. Instead, the lab found that it's common for anthrax spores to incorporate environmental silicon and oxygen into their coatings as a "natural phenomenon" that doesn't affect the spores' behavior, the official said.

To arrive at that position, however, the FBI had to discount its own bulk testing results showing that silicon composed an extraordinary 10.8 percent of a sample from a mailing to the New York Post and as much as 1.8 percent of the anthrax from a letter sent to Democratic Sen. Patrick Leahy of Vermont, far more than the occasional trace contamination. Tin — not usually seen in anthrax powder at all — was measured at 0.65 percent and 0.2 percent, respectively, in those letters.

An FBI spokesman declined to comment on the presence of tin or to answer other questions about the silicon-tin connection.

Several scientists and former colleagues of Ivins argue that he was a career biologist who probably lacked the chemistry knowledge and skills to concoct a silicon-based additive.

"There's no way that an individual scientist can invent a new way of making anthrax using silicon and tin," said Stuart Jacobsen, a Texas-based analytical chemist for an electronics company who's closely studied the FBI lab results. "It requires an institutional effort to do this, such as at a military lab."

Martin Hugh-Jones, a world-renowned anthrax expert who teaches veterinary medicine at Louisiana State University, called it "just bizarre" that the labs found both tin — which can be toxic to bacteria such as anthrax during lab culturing — and silicon.

"You have two elements at abnormally high levels," Hugh-Jones said. "That reduces your probability to a very small number that it's an accident."

The silicon-tin connection wasn't the only lead left open in one of the biggest investigations in FBI history, an inquiry that took the bureau to the cutting edge of laboratory science. In April, McClatchy reported that after locking in on Ivins in 2007, the bureau stopped searching for a match to a unique genetic bacterial strain scientists had found in the anthrax that was mailed to the Post and to NBC News anchor Tom Brokaw, although a senior bureau official had characterized it as the hottest clue to date.

FBI officials say it's all a moot point, because they're positive they got the right man in Ivins. A mentally troubled anthrax researcher at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases at Fort Detrick, Md., Ivins overdosed on drugs not long after learning that he'd soon face five counts of capital murder.

In ending the inquiry last year, the Justice Department said that a genetic fingerprint had pointed investigators to Ivins' lab, and gumshoe investigative techniques enabled them to compile considerable circumstantial evidence that demonstrated his guilt.

Among these proofs, prosecutors cited Ivins' alleged attempt to steer investigators away from a flask of anthrax in his lab that genetically matched the mailed powder — anthrax that had been shared with other researchers. They also noted his anger over a looming congressional cut in funds for his research on a new anthrax vaccine.

However, the FBI never found hard evidence that Ivins produced the anthrax or that he scrawled threatening letters seemingly meant to resemble those of Islamic terrorists. Or that he secretly took late-night drives to Princeton, N.J., to mail them.

The FBI declared Ivins the killer soon after paying $5.8 million to settle a suit filed by another former USAMRIID researcher, Steven Hatfill, whom the agency mistakenly had targeted earlier in its investigation.

Anthrax is one of the deadliest and most feared biological weapons. Once inhaled, microscopic anthrax spores germinate into rapidly multiplying, highly toxic bacteria that attack human tissue. The resulting illnesses are lethal within days if untreated.

The letters, mailed just weeks after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, not only went to the New York Post, Leahy and Brokaw, but also to American Media Inc. in Boca Raton, Fla., and to Democratic then-Sen. Tom Daschle of South Dakota. Five people died, 17 were sickened and about 31,000 were forced to take powerful antibiotics for weeks. Crews wearing moon suits spent several weeks eradicating the spores from a Senate office building and a central Postal Service facility in Washington.

The FBI guarded its laboratory's finding of 10.8 percent silicon in the Post letter for years. New York Democratic Rep. Jerrold Nadler asked FBI Director Robert Mueller [allegedly extorted by Trudeau and Marcy] how much silicon was in the Post and Leahy letters at a hearing before the House Judiciary Committee in September 2008. The Justice Department responded seven months later that silicon made up 1.4 percent of the Leahy powder (without disclosing the 1[0].8 percent reading) and that "a reliable quantitative measurement was not possible" for the Post letter.

The bureau's conclusions that silicon was absorbed naturally drew a gentle challenge in February from a panel of the National Academy of Sciences, which evaluated the investigation's lab work.

While finding no evidence that silicon had been added to the mailed anthrax, the panel noted deep in its report that the FBI had provided "no compelling explanation" for conflicts in silicon test results between the Sandia National Laboratories and its own lab.

Sandia — which used electron microscopes, unlike the FBI — reported only a tenth as much silicon in the New York Post letter as the bureau's lab did. Sandia said it was all embedded in the spore coatings, where it wasn't harmful.

The Armed Forces Institute of Pathology ran a third set of tests and found pockets of heavy silica concentrations, but it couldn't say whether they were inside or outside the spores.

Jacobsen, the Texas chemist, suspects that the silica pockets represented excess material that went through a chemical reaction and hardened before it could penetrate the spores.

The National Academy of Sciences panel wrote that the varying composition of the powder might have accounted for the differing findings.

While finding no evidence that silicon was added, the panel said it "cannot rule out the intentional addition of a silicon-based substance ... in a failed attempt to enhance dispersion" of the New York Post powder.

Tufts University chemistry professor David Walt, who led the panel's analysis of the silicon issue, said in a phone interview that "there was not enough silicon in the spores that could account for the total silicon content of the bulk analysis."

He said it was unclear whether the "trace" levels of tin were significant.

During the FBI's seven-year hunt, the Department of Homeland Security commissioned a team of chemists at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California to grow anthrax-like spores under varying conditions to see how much silicon would end up naturally in the final product.

They found little, if any, silicon in most cases, far less than was in the New York Post letter, said Stephan Velsko, one of the two researchers. He called the tin readings from the FBI's anthrax data "baffling."

Peter Weber, Velsko's co-researcher, said the academy panel's focus on the conflicting data "raises a big question," and "it'd be really helpful for closure of this case if that was resolved."

He suggested that further "micro-analysis" with a highly sophisticated electron microscope could "pop the question marks really quickly."

In a chapter in a recently updated book, "Microbial Forensics," Velsko wrote that the anthrax "must have indeed been produced under an unusual set of conditions" to create such high silicon counts. That scenario, he cautioned, might not be "consistent with the prosecution narrative in this case."

About 100 tin-catalyzed silicone products are on the market, and an even wider array was available in 2000 and 2001, before the mailings, said Richie Ashburn, a vice president of one manufacturer, Silicones Inc., in High Point, N.C.

Mike Wilson, a chemist for another silicone products maker, SiVance, in Gainesville, Fla., said that numerous silicon products could be used to make spores or other particles water-repellent. He also said that the ratios of silicon to tin found in the Post and Leahy samples would be "about right" if a tin-catalyzed silicone had been added to the spores.

Jacobsen, a Scottish-born and -educated chemist who once experimented with silicon coatings on dust particles, said he got interested in the spore chemistry after hearing rumors in late 2001 that a U.S. military facility had made the killer potions. He called it "outrageous" that the scientific issues haven't been addressed.

"America, the most advanced country in the world, and the FBI have every resource available to them," he said. "And yet they have no compelling explanation for not properly analyzing the biggest forensic clue in the most important investigation the FBI labs had ever gotten in their history."

As a result of Ivins' death and the unanswered scientific issues, Congress' investigative arm, the Government Accountability Office, is investigating the FBI's handling of the anthrax inquiry.

(Tish Wells contributed to this article.)

http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/05/19/114467/fbi-lab-reports-on-anthrax-attacks.html

“[Evidence Degussa and Bombardier share directors who therefore had Matrix 5 opportunities to combine aerial spraying of anthrax powders with EW technology used on 911] The Stanley Works March 14, 2000 Dear Fellow Shareowner: You are cordially invited to attend Stanley's Annual Meeting of Shareowners to be held at 9:30 a.m. on Wednesday, April 19, 2000, at the New Britain High School, 110 Mill Street, New Britain, Connecticut ... HUGO E. UYTERHOEVEN, Timken Professor of Business Administration Emeritus, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, where he has been a member of the faculty since 1960. He is a director of Bombardier, Inc., Degussa [manufacturer of anthrax sabotage spore powder] - Huls AG., Ecolab, Inc., and Harcourt General, Inc. .. 68 years old and owns 26,799 shares”

“[Evidence that Lena Trudeau and Kristine Marcy have built a secret Matrix 5 police force to disrupt FBI crime scene investigations by extortion and virtual deception] A Report by a Panel of the NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION For the U. S. Congress and the Department of Defense June 2010 The Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System An Independent Assessment of Design, Implementation, and Impact Project Study Team Lena E. Trudeau, Vice President The views expressed in this report are those of the Panel. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the Academy as an institution. National Academy of Public Administration [President and Chief Executive Officer Kristine Marcy] 900 7th Street, N.W. Suite 600 Washington, DC 20001-3888 www.napawash.org FOREWORD The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 brought the missions and roles of the United States intelligence community into the public consciousness in ways previously unseen. Subsequent successful and unsuccessful attempts around the world, including the 2009 Christmas Day and the recent New York Times Square bombing attempts, have continued to demonstrate the importance of high-performing intelligence personnel in protecting and strengthening our nation’s security. At the core of the intelligence apparatus are dedicated men and women entrusted with the most important and sensitive missions related to the national security of the United States. They include the civilian employees of the U.S. Department of Defense’s (DoD) intelligence components—50,000 strong—who work tirelessly in the public interest at the National Security Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, Defense Security Service, National Reconnaissance Office, and the intelligence elements of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. These public servants work to achieve missions that are more critical than ever: defending our nation and thwarting attack. The Academy Panel recognized that the manner in which the performance of these employees is assessed and rewarded is as important to how—and how well—they do their work, as it is to recruitment and retention. A culture that encourages “connecting the dots” and finding new ways to look at “dots” cannot be built on a system that rewards longevity over performance. The Panel concluded that a performance-based pay system that provides recognition for individual as well as collaborative performance can produce more robust discussion and better intelligence products that will significantly strengthen our ability to thwart attacks. For the past four years, DoD has engaged in the design and implementation of the Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System (DCIPS), which is intended to unify the DoD intelligence components under a single human resources management system. DCIPS represents transformational cultural change that requires paying as much attention to the system’s implementation as to its design. The National Academy Panel recognized the soundness of DCIPS’ design, the urgency of the effort, as well as the need to make certain changes in its planned implementation prior to moving forward. This report provides key recommendations aimed at encouraging greater collaboration among the intelligence components, restoring and building employee trust in DCIPS and, most importantly, strengthening personal accountability in the performance of agency missions. The stakes have never been higher. And, our intelligence personnel deserve nothing less. The National Academy was pleased to conduct this review for Congress and the Secretary of Defense. I want to thank the Academy Panel for its excellent and diligent work and the study team for its significant contributions. In addition, I wish to acknowledge the vital assistance provided by the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence and his staff, as well as the DoD intelligence components and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Finally, my appreciation goes to those personnel who provided access to critical information and contributed their insights through interviews, focus groups, agency forums, colloquia, and online dialogue. Their work should not go unnoticed by the American public, which owes them a significant debt of gratitude. Jennifer L. Dorn [succeeded by Kristine Marcy, Field McConnell's sister] President and Chief Executive Officer [whose 2 i/c is Pierre Elliot Trudeau's presumed love child, Lena Trudeau]”

We allege that Lena Trudeau (love child?) and Kristine Marcy have developed Entrust public key infrastructure to hide Matrix 5 attacks on the English-Speaking Peoples by francophone insiders of Bombardier and the National Academy of Public Administration.

Ottawa, you have a problem; Crown Sisters Trudeau and Marcy have woken a sleeping English-Speaking giant and the francophone talent pool appears to be exceeding shallow.



http://www.abeldanger.net/
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/hawkscafe/

1 comment:

  1. FBI lab reports on anthrax attacks suggest another miscue

    http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/05/19/114467/fbi-lab-reports-on-anthrax-attacks.html

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