ATC Global 2013 - ITT Exelis Workshop
[Ad Hoc Waypoints 2:14]
McConnell claims the former Serco CEO Chris Hyman and the former COO of the U.S. Small Business Administration Ms. Marcy, set up AF Space Command war rooms on the 47th Floor of WTC#1 and the 18th Floor of WTC#7 so their operatives could overlay an ad hoc waypoint for the Naudet camera with a fly-over waypoint for the al-Qaeda drone to give the traitor sisters the money shot they needed to launch the "first live broadcast mass snuff film in human history."
McConnell invites those against whom he is alleging treason to rebut or face the consequences.
McConnell makes his allegations against the “Sisters" and the Serco directors, investors and operatives who helped them develop an al-Qaeda database for the National Visa Center and the phony "Red Team" decoy and drone maneuvers for AF Space Command.
McConnell believes the penalties for failure to rebut his allegations will range from up to seven years imprisonment if an accused is found guilty of misprision of treason to the death sentence for American citizens found guilty of treason in a criminal trial or for non-citizens – including immigrants living in the United States – found guilty by a military tribunal.
Prequel 1: #2193: Marine Links Serco Obama Insider Trading Frauds To Malaysia Airlines Waypoint Bombs
Prequel 2: JULES NAUDET'S FIRST PLANE SHOT WAS STAGED A Clue to the Truth about 9/11 ?
9/11: The Naudet-Hanlon Conspiracy
STABILIZED & COMPLETE 911
South Tower Impact CGI Fakes Compilation
E4B (Air Force One) on 9/11 Over Washington DC;
Bush Sr. Inside White House
Serco... Would you like to know more?
"3d. This version of picture 3c demonstrates (a) just how much of the Trade Center towers is hidden behind the buildings on the west side of Church Street — almost a full two thirds of their height; and (b) the fact that, just as the towers are exactly in the horizontal centre of the frame, the plane impact is almost exactly in the vertical centre of the only part of Tower One Naudet can properly see, on the only side he can properly see, the north face (see Convenience 32). The top third of the tower stretched from around Floor 73 to Floor 110, with midpoint at about Floor 92 ; the plane cut through Floors 93 to 99, just above that midpoint. If Naudet had been in collusion with whoever was flying that plane, and had told them exactly where he wanted them to hit the building — about half-way down the top third sector of the north face — the result could hardly have been more perfect. Impact smack in the centre of the visible part of the tower, towers smack in the centre of the picture: this is an accident ? The plane could have hit the north face at any point in about the top 60% of its height (avoiding the 570-foot No. 7 building), but anything below the top 33% would have been out of view [Chris Hyman was allegedly directing snuff film operations from an AF Space Command war room in the offices of Adjusters International on the 47th Floor!] , and it actually hit about 13% from the top, less than a quarter as far down as it could have gone — and it could have hit much lower than 60% down on any of the other three sides, none of those areas visible. But it didn't — it hit exactly where it was most convenient to Naudet. This is luck?"
Figure 2: Fly-by and Fly-over Waypoints A change in direction at a fly-by waypoint requires the navigation system to "anticipate" the turn in order to intercept and fly the next leg. The amount of distance of turn anticipation (DTA), (see Figure 2) prior to the waypoint depends primarily on the aircraft speed and the angle of the turn. At a fly-over waypoint, the aircraft will not turn to intercept the following leg until passing over or abeam the waypoint. Aircraft speed and angle of turn will influence the resulting flight path. Fly-over waypoints are shown on charts within a circle.
Given that some variation will always exist in the flight path, there is a much higher level of predictability and repeatability with a fly-by versus a fly-over waypoint. Fly-by waypoints also require less protected airspace than fly-over waypoints. Controllers should remember that aircraft normally maneuver inside of the turn prior to reaching a fly-by waypoint. For a fly-over waypoint, the turn will occur after reaching the waypoint. The final (terminating) waypoint of a procedure will be flown as a fly-over waypoint."
"March 18, 2002 … Diary of Valor
By Susan Horsburgh Jules and Gedeon Naudet's Footage of the WTC Attacks—Now Part of a CBS Documentary—May Become the Zapruder Tape of 9/11 It was a routine call—a reported gas leak on Church Street in lower Manhattan. French filmmakers Jules and Gedeon Naudet were with the men of Engine 7, Ladder 1, shooting a documentary about a year in the life of a rookie, or "pro-bie," in the New York City Fire Department. Gedeon elected to stay at the firehouse; brother Jules followed a crew to the leak site six blocks away. It was Sept. 11, 8:45 a.m.
Out on the street, Jules heard a roar overhead. Pointing his video camera skyward, he captured the first plane crashing into the north tower of the World Trade Center. "It's a day I don't like to talk about," says Jules, 28, who raced 14 blocks to the scene with the battalion chief. Nonstop for the next two hours he taped the chaos—falling bodies, people on fire, screaming office workers—and the frantic rescue efforts as doomed firefighters rushed up the stairwells. "I think I will only be able to talk about it years from now."
Until then the filmmakers are letting their footage speak for them. Now the centerpiece of a two-hour documentary, 9/11, their gripping account will air on CBS March 10, with an introduction by actor and lower Manhattan resident Robert De Niro. Though the graphic images have been edited out, the Naudets left profanity uncensored. David Bianculli of New York's Daily News called it "an astonishing, riveting, remarkable piece of filmmaking."
But some survivors of Sept. 11 victims say the trauma is still too raw to relive. They have appealed to CBS not to air the footage; others are asking for viewer warnings and that screams and the sounds of bodies hitting the pavement be edited out. "This is just showing it all over again for the ratings," says Mary Ellen Salamone, 39, a North Caldwell, N.J., physical therapist who lost her husband, John, 37, in the north tower. (CBS says it's mindful of the families' feelings but will not stop the broadcast.) Though the Naudets sold the 10-second clip of the first plane crash to cover costs, they say they turned down multimillion-dollar offers so they could retain control of the footage and ensure it was handled sensitively. "We knew it was a part of history," says Jules.
Born in Paris, Jules and Gedeon, 31, also know something about a sense of vocation. Their parents, journalist Jean-Jacques and clothing designer Shiva [How stupid do they think we are?], instilled in them a love of film. Their dad, a former movie critic for French Vogue, kept them up to watch Hitchcock films and gave them their first video camera in 1982. After the family moved to New York City in 1989, both brothers went to New York University Film School. Their first documentary, Hope, Gloves and Redemption, about young boxers in Spanish Harlem, took honors at the 2000 New York International Independent Film and Video Festival. "It was a hard world to get into," says Jules.
The tight-knit brotherhood of the FDNY proved even harder. The Naudets' firefighter friend (and fellow 9/11 producer) James Hanlon, who is married to an old school friend of theirs from Paris, helped them gain permission from FDNY brass in late 2000—a process which took more than six months. But Hanlon's colleagues at the Engine 7 firehouse were leery of their presence when they started filming last May. "There were a lot of guys saying they didn't want to be on camera," recalls Hanlon, 36.
That changed on Sept. 11. After the first plane crash, Jules stuck with battalion chief Joseph Pfeifer as he deployed firefighters from the north tower lobby. A few blocks away, Gedeon was by now filming the second plane slamming into the south tower at 9:03 a.m. Jules heard the news that the Pentagon had been hit—and then a deafening rumble as the south tower fell, covering the north tower's lobby with debris. Everything went black. "I didn't really know what had happened," says Jules, who had crouched down in the lobby, covering his face with his T-shirt. As his grit-covered video camera kept taping, he used its floodlight to find his way out. Unknowingly half a block apart when the second tower came down, the Naudets did not find each other until two hours later at the firehouse. "It was the best feeling in the world when I saw my brother," says Jules.
After Sept. 11 Jules set a date for his wedding to longtime girlfriend Jacqueline Longa. "That day showed that if you know what you want, just do it," says Longa, 29, a human resources counselor. (They hope to marry at the firehouse June 1.) It also sealed other bonds—with the 55 men of Engine 7, all of whom miraculously survived. "That night, when we got back to the station house," says Jules, "one of the guys told me, 'You left here this morning with one brother. Tonight you have 55.'"
Susan Horsburgh
Bob Meadows in New York City"
"Message from Chair Jacqueline A. Berrien on the 10th Anniversary of 9/11
September 11, 2011 Dear EEOC Colleagues:
Ten years ago, like so many people across the United States and the globe, I was shocked and sickened to witness the destructive force of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in Northern Virginia, and the fatal crash in Shanksville, Pennsylvania of an airplane en route to an unknown target in Washington, DC. The images of danger and suffering associated with September 11, 2001 are an indelible part of our national memory. As the nation solemnly observes the 10th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, many of us will pause to honor the memories of the victims of this senseless violence and convey condolences to their surviving family members and friends. And of course, the selflessness and bravery of those who risked their own health and safety in order to help others during the attacks must never be forgotten.
I also believe, however, that it is important to remember that countless acts of compassion and courage followed closely behind this unprecedented tragedy, and ultimately helped to restore to survivors and witnesses a measure of faith that we would somehow, someday recover from the grief and loss that we experienced collectively on September 11th. In that spirit, I am taking this opportunity to recall the extraordinary resilience and fortitude of the EEOC employees who worked in offices located near the sites of the attacks, and the compassionate and swift response of EEOC staff across the country who mobilized to support their colleagues in the wake of 9/11.
As many of you know, but those who have come to the EEOC in the past decade may not, in 2001 the EEOC’s New York District Office [shared with Kristine Marcy’s SBA Sisters] was located on the 18th floor of building 7 of the World Trade Center complex, only a few hundred yards from the Center’s twin towers. Thanks to the skill and courage of the evacuation team, our employees were safely evacuated from 7 World Trade Center. However, shortly after they made it out of the building, many witnessed firsthand the total destruction of the towers that stood directly across from their offices. While there were, thankfully, no physical injuries or deaths among our staff, Philadelphia District Office Director Spencer Lewis, who was then serving as Director of the New York District Office, said that the “emotional toll [wa]s unimaginable." In our Washington, D.C. offices, all employees were safely evacuated after the Pentagon was hit. However, reported threats that other government buildings -- including the White House and Capitol – were slated for attack kept anxiety high in Washington for the entire day, and indeed for a long period after September 11th.
On the afternoon of September 11th, several hours after the collapse of the towers, 7 World Trade Center, the home of our New York District Office, also collapsed. Our employees’ personal effects and all of the agency's files, ork products and equipment were completely destroyed in the collapse. Incredibly, New York City firefighter John Misha later recovered the agency seal from rubble at the scene of the collapse. The recovered seal remains on display today – battered, yet miraculously intact – in the entry to the New York District Office.
In spite of the catastrophic losses suffered in New York, within days of the attacks, EEOC began the painstaking work of reconstructing files and reproducing the work product that was buried under the rubble of 7 World Trade Center. Significantly, many offices and staff across the country pitched in to ease and expedite the recovery effort. Intake calls were re-routed to Boston, Massachusetts; temporary offices were housed in Newark, New Jersey; "care packages" were sent from employees in Houston, Texas to their colleagues in New York; and to buoy depressed spirits, EEOC staff across the country sent supportive messages and placed calls to the New York District Office staff.
The remarkable pace of the restoration of normal operations is memorialized in agency press releases: on September 12, 2001 an EEOC press release announced, “EEOC New York Office Destroyed in Terrorist Attack on World Trade Center”; only 16 days after the attacks, the agency announced that the New York District Office would resume partial operations the following week; and a little more than a month after the attacks, the press was informed that the EEOC “re-opened for business at a temporary Manhattan location, restoring essential agency services to residents of the New York area.” None of this would have been possible without the concerted effort and tireless support of many members of our staff and the commitment of Chair Cari M. Dominguez to the swift and complete restoration of the New York District Office’s operations after 9/11.
On this occasion, I believe that it is also fitting to recall how quickly and effectively EEOC employees addressed novel workplace discrimination issues that arose in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, and to consider the continuing significance of that work to the agency and the Nation. While the terrorist attacks inspired countless acts of heroism and goodwill throughout our nation, unfortunately, many religious, ethnic, and national origin minorities became the victims of pernicious discrimination in the workplace. In the initial months after the attacks, the EEOC saw a 250 percent increase in the number of religion-based discrimination charges involving Muslims and persons of Middle Eastern descent.
Responding quickly, the EEOC began a targeted outreach campaign aimed at educating employers, civil rights organizations, and members of religious groups on employee and employer rights and responsibilities under the law and how to prevent religious and national origin discrimination in the aftermath of 9/11. Within days of the terrorist attacks, Chair Dominguez issued a press release “call[ing] on all employers and employees across the country to promote tolerance and guard against unlawful workplace discrimination based on national origin or religion.” The Commission also held a public meeting in December 2001 on 9/11 backlash discrimination and best practices to prevent and address this type of discrimination in the workplace.
Today, despite the best efforts of the EEOC and many enforcement partners, we continue to see more charges involving religious discrimination and national origin discrimination against Muslims and people who are or are perceived to be from Middle Eastern nations. As a result, in addition to our general outreach and education efforts to ensure the Nation’s laws prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of religion and national origin are vigorously enforced, the EEOC has continued to work closely with stakeholders most affected by backlash discrimination to ensure that both employees and employers are aware of their rights and responsibilities.
Looking toward the future, I have asked Commissioner Ishimaru to lead a task force to examine immigration related employment issues. This group will evaluate and make recommendations to improve EEOC’s and the federal government’s accessibility to immigrant communities and more effectively coordinate our enforcement, litigation, outreach and education efforts related to national origin discrimination.
In observance of the 9/11 Anniversary, I have asked the Office of Communications and Legislative Affairs (OCLA) to release a public statement on EEOC’s enforcement activities post-9/11 and re-release a statement by Spencer H. Lewis, Former Director of the New York District office entitled, “The Impact of September 11, 2001: New York’s Experience.” Both are referenced in this statement, but I encourage you to read them in their entirety on our website page dedicated to 9/11.
Throughout this week, in your homes, places of worship, offices, and neighborhoods, you may observe a moment of silence, participate in memorial services, or otherwise take a break from your daily routine to remember the victims and express support for the survivors of 9/11. As you do so, please reserve a special moment in your thoughts and prayers for your colleagues in the EEOC whose lives were changed forever by what they witnessed and experienced ten years ago today. Finally, I hope that you will join me in honoring the exemplary manner in which the EEOC responded to one of the most difficult periods in the history of the agency and the nation.
Sincerely and with deepest gratitude,
Jacqueline A. Berrien Chair"
"Considering what was not done suggests possible ways to institutionalize imagination. To return to the four elements of analysis just mentioned: FORESIGHT—AND HINDSIGHT
1. The CTC did not analyze how an aircraft, hijacked or explosives laden, might be used as a weapon. It did not perform this kind of analysis [but Serco-Sister operatives at the National Visa Center and the US Air Force Space Command did exactly that] from the enemy’s perspective (“red team” analysis), even though suicide terrorism had become a principal tactic of Middle Eastern terrorists. If it had done so, we believe such an analysis would soon have spotlighted a critical constraint for the terrorists—finding a suicide operative able to fly large jet aircraft. They had never done so before 9/11. 2. The CTC did not develop a set of telltale indicators for this method of attack. For example, one such indicator might be the discovery of possible terrorists pursuing flight training to fly large jet aircraft, or seeking to buy advanced flight simulators.
3. The CTC did not propose, and the intelligence community collection management process did not set, requirements to monitor such telltale indicators. Therefore the warning system was not looking for information such as the July 2001 FBI report of potential terrorist interest in various kinds of aircraft training in Arizona, or the August 2001 arrest of Zacarias Moussaoui because of his suspicious behavior in a Minnesota flight school. In late August, the Moussaoui arrest was briefed to the DCI and other top CIA officials under the heading “Islamic Extremist Learns to Fly.”24 Because the system was not tuned to comprehend the potential significance of this information, the news had no effect on warning.
4. Neither the intelligence community nor aviation security experts analyze systemic defenses within an aircraft or against terrorist controlled aircraft, suicidal or otherwise. The many threat reports mentioning aircraft were passed to the FAA. While that agency continued to react to specific, credible threats, it did not try to perform the broader warning functions we describe here. No one in the government was taking on that role for domestic vulnerabilities.”
"American Airlines Flight 11 was a domestic passenger flight that was hijacked by five al-Qaeda members on September 11, 2001, as part of the September 11 attacks. They deliberately crashed it into the North Tower of the World Trade Center in New York City, killing all 92 people aboard and an unknown number in the building's impact zone. The aircraft involved, a Boeing 767-223ER, was flying American Airlines' daily scheduled morning transcontinental service from Logan International Airport, in Boston, Massachusetts, to Los Angeles International Airport, in Los Angeles, California."
"Serco is committed to providing an equitable opportunity for Small Business, Small Disadvantaged Business, Woman-Owned Small Business, HUBzone Small Business, and Veteran Owned Small Business and Service Disabled Veteran Owned Small Business Concerns to participate in subcontracting opportunities on our contracts. Serco is dedicated to the programs described in Federal Acquisition Regulation Part 19. We will continually seek diverse suppliers and subcontractors to increase our supplier base and to participate on our contracts as we strive to provide value-added services in support of Government objectives.
At Serco, we recognize that the Government's Small Business subcontracting programs require the promotion of equitable opportunities for all small businesses to compete for contracts. We recognize that small businesses are a vital part of our economy. We strive to promote the participation of Small Business, Small Disadvantaged Business, Woman-Owned Small Business, HUBzone Small Business, and Veteran Owned Small Business and Service Disabled Veteran Owned Small Business Concerns, in support of the delivery of products and services to the Government.
In support of our commitment to Small Business and supplier diversity, we will:
Give fair consideration and opportunity to Small Business, Small Disadvantaged Business, Woman-Owned Small Business, HUBzone Small Business, and Veteran Owned Small Business and Service Disabled Veteran Owned Small Business Concerns to participate, in Serco's subcontracting process.
Seek and develop relationships with Small Business, Small Disadvantaged Business, Woman-Owned Small Business, HUBzone Small Business, and Veteran Owned Small Business and Service Disabled Veteran Owned Small Business Concerns in order to develop a diverse supplier pool.
Attend workshops, seminars, trade fairs, and conferences designed to identify Small Business, Small Disadvantaged Business, Woman-Owned Small Business, HUBzone Small Business, and Veteran Owned Small Business and Service Disabled Veteran Owned Small Business Concerns with which to pursue business opportunities.
Publicize our interest in establishing relationships with Small Business, Small Disadvantaged Business, Woman-Owned Small Business, HUBzone Small Business, and Veteran Owned Small Business and Service Disabled Veteran Owned Small Business Concerns interested in Serco's subcontracting opportunities. Provide information and training on how to do business with Serco's Small Disadvantaged Business, Woman-Owned Small Business, HUBzone Small Business, and Veteran Owned Small Business and Service Disabled Veteran Owned Small Business Concerns.
Ensure that Serco employees are informed of the Small Business/Supplier Diversity policies important to our business practices."
"Serco Services Inc. 10-K 2006
Throughout this document, we occasionally distinguish between SI International, Inc., as a company separate from its subsidiaries, and SI International, Inc., as a company combined with its subsidiaries. In order to clarify which entity we are referring to in various discussions, we use the terms "SI International, Inc." and “SI International” to refer to SI International, Inc. without its subsidiaries. All other references, including "SI," "the Company," "we" and "us" refer to SI International and its subsidiaries.
...
NVC Contract Award. On January 31, 2006, in a recompetition for our expiring National Visa Center, or NVC, contract, we were awarded the successor contract for the NVC contract by the Department of State. Under the contract, we anticipate performing over 20 million immigrant visa transactions each year at the NVC in Portsmouth, New Hampshire and at the Kentucky Consular Center in Williamsburg, Kentucky. The prime contract has a one-year base period and four one-year options with an announced value of approximately $84 million, inclusive of the options.
We are a provider of mission critical information technology and network solutions primarily to the Federal Government. Our business is guided by our experienced team of eight executive officers and over twenty-five other corporate officers who manage and are responsible for successfully growing our business. As of the end of fiscal year 2005, we employed over 4,000 employees. Approximately 85% of our employees hold Federal Government security clearances or have passed National Agency Checks. Approximately 15% of our employees hold Top Secret security clearances. A significant portion of our employees who hold Top Secret security clearances also hold Sensitive Compartmental Information clearances, which permit us to bid on highly classified projects.
Our broad set of contract vehicles gives us extensive reach and enables us to deliver a full range of our services and solutions to the Federal Government. The strength of our service offerings and information technology expertise allows us to maintain substantial relationships with clients, some of whom have been clients of ours, or of one of our acquired businesses, for over 20 years. In fiscal 2005 and fiscal 2004, we derived approximately 75% and 81%, respectively, of our revenue from contracts on which we acted as prime contractor. Acting as a prime contractor provides us with stronger client relationships, as well as the visibility and access to new work that are not available when acting as a subcontractor. Our total backlog as of December 31, 2005 was approximately $854 million, of which approximately $191 million was funded. See "—Backlog" for a discussion of how we calculate backlog.
Risks Related to Our Industry
We depend on contracts with the Federal Government for most of our revenue, and our business would be seriously harmed if the government ceased doing business with us or significantly decreased the amount of business it does with us.
We derived 98.1% and 96.6% of our total revenue in fiscal 2005 and in fiscal 2004, respectively, from Federal Government contracts, either as a prime contractor or a subcontractor. This includes 46.9% and 52.8% of our total revenue in fiscal 2005 and in fiscal 2004, respectively, that we derived, either as a prime contractor or a subcontractor, from contracts with agencies of the DoD and Intelligence community. We expect that we will continue to derive most of our revenue for the foreseeable future from work performed under Federal Government contracts. If we were suspended or otherwise prohibited from contracting with the Federal Government generally, or with any significant agency of the DoD or the Intelligence community, or if our reputation or relationship with the Federal Government or any significant agency of the DoD or the Intelligence community were impaired, or if any of the foregoing otherwise ceased doing business with us or significantly decreased the amount of business it does with us, our business, prospects, financial condition and operating results would be materially adversely affected.
The following chart provides certain information regarding our four largest contracts for fiscal year 2005, in terms of revenues:
We depend on contracts with the Federal Government for most of our revenue, and our business would be seriously harmed if the government ceased doing business with us or significantly decreased the amount of business it does with us.
We derived 98.1% and 96.6% of our total revenue in fiscal 2005 and in fiscal 2004, respectively, from Federal Government contracts, either as a prime contractor or a subcontractor. This includes 46.9% and 52.8% of our total revenue in fiscal 2005 and in fiscal 2004, respectively, that we derived, either as a prime contractor or a subcontractor, from contracts with agencies of the DoD and Intelligence community. We expect that we will continue to derive most of our revenue for the foreseeable future from work performed under Federal Government contracts. If we were suspended or otherwise prohibited from contracting with the Federal Government generally, or with any significant agency of the DoD or the Intelligence community, or if our reputation or relationship with the Federal Government or any significant agency of the DoD or the Intelligence community were impaired, or if any of the foregoing otherwise ceased doing business with us or significantly decreased the amount of business it does with us, our business, prospects, financial condition and operating results would be materially adversely affected.
The following chart provides certain information regarding our four largest contracts for fiscal year 2005, in terms of revenues:
"Opened in 1994 as the successor to the Transitional Immigrant Visa Processing Center in Rosslyn, Va., the NVC centralizes all immigrant visa preprocessing and appointment scheduling for overseas posts. The NVC collects paperwork and fees before forwarding a case, ready for adjudication, to the responsible post.
The center also handles immigrant and fiancé visa petitions, and while it does not adjudicate visa applications, it provides technical assistance and support to visa-adjudicating consular officials overseas.
Only two Foreign Service officers, the director and deputy director, work at the center, along with just five Civil Service employees. They work with almost 500 contract employees doing preprocessing of visas, making the center one of the largest employers in the Portsmouth area.
The contractor, Serco, Inc., has worked with the NVC since its inception and with the Department for almost 18 years.
The NVC houses more than 2.6 million immigrant visa files, receives almost two million pieces of mail per year and received more than half a million petitions from the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS) in 2011. Its file rooms’ high-density shelves are stacked floor-to-ceiling with files, each a collection of someone’s hopes and dreams and each requiring proper handling.
….
The NVC also preprocesses the chief of mission (COM) application required for the fi ling of a petition for a Special Immigrant Visa (SIV). Such visas, for foreign nationals who have performed services for the U.S. government in Iraq and Afghanistan, require COM concurrence before the applicant can file a petition with USCIS. The NVC collects the requisite documents from such applicants and, when complete, forwards the package to the U.S. embassies in Baghdad or Kabul for COM approval"
"Update on Serco's Strategy Review including the Contract & Balance Sheet Reviews; capital structure and funding; latest trading and outlook
Date : 10 November 2014
THIS ANNOUNCEMENT AND THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS RESTRICTED AND IS NOT FOR RELEASE, PUBLICATION OR DISTRIBUTION, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, IN, INTO OR FROM THE UNITED STATES, CANADA, AUSTRALIA, JAPAN, SOUTH AFRICA OR ANY OTHER JURISDICTION IN WHICH THE SAME WOULD BE UNLAWFUL. PLEASE SEE THE IMPORTANT NOTICE AT THE END OF THIS ANNOUNCEMENT.
… Strategy Review: Serco's future to be as an international B2G business. A successful, innovative and market-leading provider of services to Governments. Core sectors: Justice & Immigration, Defence, Transport, Citizen Services and Healthcare.
….
In the Americas Division, our work for the US Affordable [Obama] Care Act (ACA) has begun an expanded first option year. Other awards in the period included: career transition services for US soldiers; health outreach services for the US Naval Reserve; deployable medical systems solutions also for the Navy; and two contracts for fleet maintenance services for commercial clients. In total, the ACA and all other awards in the period are valued at over $550m. Meanwhile, our contract supporting the Department of State's National Visa Center and Kentucky Consular Center (NVC/KCC) came to an end during the period, as did some Acquisition and Program Management support work for US intelligence agency customers. C4I2TSR services for the US Air Force and Naval installation task order work under the Sea Enterprise frameworks are also reducing. …
For further information please contact Serco:
Stuart Ford, Head of Investor Relations T +44 (0) 1256 386 227
Marcus De Ville, Head of Media Relations T +44 (0) 1256 386 226
Jonathan Glass, Brunswick T +44 (0) 207 404 5959
Analyst and institutional investor meeting…….
Download PDF [PDF, 387 KB] (Please note: this link will open the page in a new browser window)"
Yours sincerely,
Field McConnell, United States Naval Academy, 1971; Forensic Economist; 30 year airline and 22 year military pilot; 23,000 hours of safety; Tel: 715 307 8222
David Hawkins Tel: 604 542-0891 Forensic Economist; former leader of oil-well blow-out teams; now sponsors Grand Juries in CSI Crime and Safety Investigation
No comments:
Post a Comment
Note: Only a member of this blog may post a comment.