________
Source: Responsible Statecraft
Tehran has a long history with the Pashtuns across the border so their optimism is a bit tempered these days.
September 1, 2021 | by Shireen Hunter
A Taliban government in Kabul will have important ramifications for all of Afghanistan's neighbors, in one way or another. However, of all Afghanistan's neighbors, Iran could be affected most negatively.
Source: Responsible Statecraft
Tehran has a long history with the Pashtuns across the border so their optimism is a bit tempered these days.
September 1, 2021 | by Shireen Hunter
A Taliban government in Kabul will have important ramifications for all of Afghanistan's neighbors, in one way or another. However, of all Afghanistan's neighbors, Iran could be affected most negatively.
It shares nearly 1,000 kilometers of common borders with Afghanistan. It already hosts between 2.5 and 4 million Afghan citizens and will find it difficult to cope with a possible surge of tens — or even hundreds — of thousands more Afghans who wish to flee their homeland. Moreover, as a Persian-speaking Shia majority state, it is intensely disliked by the Pashtun Taliban, who adhere to a Sunni extremist ideology. Some of Iran’s Sunni minority, especially in the impoverished and often-restive province of Sistan and Baluchistan, share the Taliban's ideology.
Iran also has a history of conflict with the Taliban and, in the 1990s, was a major supporter of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance. In 1998, after the Taliban killed its diplomats in Mazar-e-Sharif, Iran almost went to war with them.
The Taliban's swift victory has shocked the Iranians, although the current situation is somewhat different from the 1990s. For some time now, Iran has had contacts with the Taliban and has even hosted their representatives in Tehran.
Mixed reactions and putting up a good front
Reactions in Iran to the Taliban victory have been mixed, largely depending on political tendencies. Because of their anti-Americanism, Iranian hardliners have interpreted the Taliban’s victory as a U.S. defeat and thus good for Iran.
The head of Iran’s National Security Council, Admiral Ali Shamkhani, has hailed the Taliban's takeover and the U.S. departure from Afghanistan as a victory for the anti-imperialist forces. Ali Akbar Velayati, a former foreign minister and advisor to the Supreme leader, has called the new Afghanistan part of “the Resistance Axis," which includes Syria, Hezbollah, and some Palestinian movements.
The hardliners also claim that the Taliban have changed and no longer harbor anti-Shia and anti-Iran sentiments. However, a larger number of moderate Iranian clerics, politicians, and intellectuals disagree, insisting that the hardliners are engaged in wishful thinking and blinded by their anti-Americanism.
In the skeptics’ view, the Taliban have not changed, and their more conciliatory statements regarding other ethnic and religious minorities in Afghanistan and towards Afghanistan’s neighbors is a tactical ploy. The skeptics believe that, after consolidating their power, the Taliban will revert to their past behavior and will forget their promises.
In a recent article, Masih Mohajeri, the editor of the newspaper Jomhouri e Islami (Islamic Republic), criticized the simple-mindedness of those, including the Voice and Vision, the Iran's official radio and television network, who portray the Taliban as reformed.
In short, unlike those Iranian hardliners who view all regional developments through an anti-American lens and see any U.S. retrenchment as a win for Iran, most Iranians are deeply worried about what a Taliban government could mean for Iran’s internal security, economic interests, and regional position.
Security and economic risks to Iran
A major security threat to Iran is the potential flow of more Afghan refugees. Because of the U.S. sanctions, Iran could not hope for substantial aid in dealing with a new flood of refugees that would, in any event, almost certainly aggravate Iran's existing social problems. Meanwhile, if Iran refuses to accept more Afghan refugees, it would risk the ire of those already in Iran. There have already been protests by anti-Taliban Afghan refugees in Iran.
In addition, the Taliban have some sympathizers in Iran's Sistan and Baluchistan province, which has a substantial Sunni community, some members of which adhere to the same anti-Shia and Saudi-inspired Salafi-Wahhabi ideology as the Pashtun Taliban itself has emulated. The Imam of the Sunni mosque in the provincial capital of Zahedan, Molavi Abdul Hamid, has supported the Taliban and was jubilant over their victory.
A Taliban government could use its sympathizers to pressure Iran. It could even revive the extremist Sunni insurgents in Baluchistan, who in the 1990s and 2000s bombed mosques, attacked military posts and personnel, and promoted secession. They were helped by Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Pakistan. For the most part, Islamabad did not cooperate with Iranian border guards to contain their operations and refused to return to Iran those members who fled to Pakistan.
Please go to Responsible Statecraft to read more.
Iran also has a history of conflict with the Taliban and, in the 1990s, was a major supporter of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance. In 1998, after the Taliban killed its diplomats in Mazar-e-Sharif, Iran almost went to war with them.
The Taliban's swift victory has shocked the Iranians, although the current situation is somewhat different from the 1990s. For some time now, Iran has had contacts with the Taliban and has even hosted their representatives in Tehran.
Mixed reactions and putting up a good front
Reactions in Iran to the Taliban victory have been mixed, largely depending on political tendencies. Because of their anti-Americanism, Iranian hardliners have interpreted the Taliban’s victory as a U.S. defeat and thus good for Iran.
The head of Iran’s National Security Council, Admiral Ali Shamkhani, has hailed the Taliban's takeover and the U.S. departure from Afghanistan as a victory for the anti-imperialist forces. Ali Akbar Velayati, a former foreign minister and advisor to the Supreme leader, has called the new Afghanistan part of “the Resistance Axis," which includes Syria, Hezbollah, and some Palestinian movements.
The hardliners also claim that the Taliban have changed and no longer harbor anti-Shia and anti-Iran sentiments. However, a larger number of moderate Iranian clerics, politicians, and intellectuals disagree, insisting that the hardliners are engaged in wishful thinking and blinded by their anti-Americanism.
In the skeptics’ view, the Taliban have not changed, and their more conciliatory statements regarding other ethnic and religious minorities in Afghanistan and towards Afghanistan’s neighbors is a tactical ploy. The skeptics believe that, after consolidating their power, the Taliban will revert to their past behavior and will forget their promises.
In a recent article, Masih Mohajeri, the editor of the newspaper Jomhouri e Islami (Islamic Republic), criticized the simple-mindedness of those, including the Voice and Vision, the Iran's official radio and television network, who portray the Taliban as reformed.
In short, unlike those Iranian hardliners who view all regional developments through an anti-American lens and see any U.S. retrenchment as a win for Iran, most Iranians are deeply worried about what a Taliban government could mean for Iran’s internal security, economic interests, and regional position.
Security and economic risks to Iran
A major security threat to Iran is the potential flow of more Afghan refugees. Because of the U.S. sanctions, Iran could not hope for substantial aid in dealing with a new flood of refugees that would, in any event, almost certainly aggravate Iran's existing social problems. Meanwhile, if Iran refuses to accept more Afghan refugees, it would risk the ire of those already in Iran. There have already been protests by anti-Taliban Afghan refugees in Iran.
In addition, the Taliban have some sympathizers in Iran's Sistan and Baluchistan province, which has a substantial Sunni community, some members of which adhere to the same anti-Shia and Saudi-inspired Salafi-Wahhabi ideology as the Pashtun Taliban itself has emulated. The Imam of the Sunni mosque in the provincial capital of Zahedan, Molavi Abdul Hamid, has supported the Taliban and was jubilant over their victory.
A Taliban government could use its sympathizers to pressure Iran. It could even revive the extremist Sunni insurgents in Baluchistan, who in the 1990s and 2000s bombed mosques, attacked military posts and personnel, and promoted secession. They were helped by Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Pakistan. For the most part, Islamabad did not cooperate with Iranian border guards to contain their operations and refused to return to Iran those members who fled to Pakistan.
Please go to Responsible Statecraft to read more.
No comments:
Post a Comment
Note: Only a member of this blog may post a comment.