McConnell notes that the burning of Tillman’s uniforms to destroy evidence of the hit in Afghanistan, has the same M.O. as the burning of Russell Williams uniforms – the latter act allegedly intended to destroy evidence of a pedophile ring in the Canadian government – and he infers that both crimes were authorized by developers of Global Justice XML including Kristine Marcy and Canadian Governor General, David Johnston (MDA).
Prequel
#1418 Marine Links Kristine Marcy Common Alerting Protocol to Serco Clock and Captain Chic Wrongful Death
See #1:
Abel Danger Mischief Makers - Mistress of the Revels - 'Man-In-The-Middle' Attacks (Revised)
Prequel:
#1416 Marine Links Kristine Marcy to Conair Alien Hijack Crimes and Serco Contract Network Time
Countdown: Cover Up Began Within Hours Of Tillman's Death
“http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/eticket/story?page=tillmanpart1 On the morning of April 21, 2004, a day before Tillman was gunned down, a failed fuel pump on a ground mobility vehicle — Army jargon for a Humvee — brought the Ranger platoon to a halt as it searched for Taliban and al-Qaida fighters. Another pump was flown in by helicopter that night, but according to an Army synopsis of one of the investigations, it didn't fix the problem. The Army's elite fighting group — 35 soldiers in 11 vehicles — pulled out from their camp, towing the broken-down Humvee. The Rangers had no tow bar, so they improvised with straps. A few hours later, the Humvee's front end gave out near the village of Magarah and the Ranger convoy stopped.
A request for a Chinook helicopter to come move a damaged Humvee was refused, forcing the platoon to hire local transport. Lt. David Uthlaut, the leader of the Black Sheep platoon, radioed for help to have the $50,000 Humvee airlifted out by a Chinook cargo helicopter to end the delay, according to several documents from the Army investigation led by Jones. Uthlaut was told, according to the documents, that it would be three or four days until the helicopter would be available. And he was told he could not abandon the vehicle along the roadside or blow it up to keep it out of the hands of Afghan insurgents.
Back at the Camp Salerno base, Saunders, the company commander, ordered the platoon to be split. The Humvee, accompanied by 19 Rangers in five vehicles, was to be towed by a local driver to a designated "recovery point" on a road that branched off to the north, where it was to be retrieved by an Army wrecker. According to the plan, the platoon was then to reunite and hit its objectives the next morning, raiding nearby villages to look for weapons and high-value targets.
Had the platoon stayed together, it's possible the friendly-fire incident might not have happened. According to the November 2004 interview transcript of an officer involved in one of the Army's investigations, "The results that caused Corporal Tillman's death really had nothing to do with splitting that [platoon] up…" But the officer continues his sentence with, "…except for that the converging forces killed him."
After a six- to seven-hour layover in Magarah, the Rangers paid a local driver $120 to pull the crippled vehicle along the mountainous roads with his "jinga truck," a large, colorful rig used to cart everything from livestock to shrubs. But 10 or 15 minutes after the now-split platoon's first unit — which comprised Pat Tillman, 15 other Rangers and four AMF soldiers in six vehicles — had left, the jinga truck driver, who had become part of the second unit, deemed the road to the chosen recovery point to be too treacherous. He began to follow the path of the first unit toward the village of Manah. In the deep canyon, the two groups temporarily lost radio contact with each other.
It was early evening, close to 6:45. Daylight was waning along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, though it wasn't quite dark enough for night vision goggles. Suddenly, small arms fire from Afghan insurgents rained down from high atop a ridge, and an explosion rocked the floor of the canyon near where the second serial was traveling. The Rangers still in the canyon had no place to hide.
For many of the Rangers on the scene in southeastern Afghanistan, the firefight was the first of their military careers.
Making matters worse, when the trailing convoy, including the disabled Humvee and the jinga truck, was caught in the ambush, the non-English-speaking jinga driver was out in front of the Army's elite soldiers. According to the transcripts of statements given by several witnesses, the jinga truck initially blocked the convoy's escape route through the canyon. Kevin Tillman was in the rear vehicle of the second serial, which had come under fire. Beyond the canyon, the first group of Rangers, including Pat Tillman, dismounted near the tiny village of Sperah and moved into position to fire at the muzzle flashes visible at the top of the ridgeline and lay cover for the trailing convoy.
Pat Tillman and O'Neal took off to reach a position low on the ridgeline. The Afghan soldier, who had been in the vehicle behind Pat Tillman, followed them.
As the second unit's lead vehicle broke free of the canyon, Baker, who was standing in the front passenger side, spotted the dark-skinned Afghan soldier on his feet and firing an AK-47 in the direction of the convoy. Baker told ESPN.com that he didn't realize he had targeted a friendly Afghan soldier, one of four who a few days earlier had joined the Rangers for a sweep operation of the countryside, or that the Afghan was firing over the convoy, at an enemy position high atop the ridge line.
Neither, Baker said, did he realize that just a few feet off the Afghan's right shoulder were two Americans in Ranger uniforms: Pat Tillman and O'Neal. Baker fired.
The Afghan was killed, his gut torn open as Baker let loose eight rounds.
Baker's first shots triggered wild, frenzied firing from the young shooters under his charge in the vehicle, engaging everything in the vicinity of the friendly Afghan.
"Well, we teach our guys to, you know — one of our fire commands is to shoot where the leader shoots," Baker said to ESPN.com.
And that is what they did?
"Right," Baker answered.
The Cardinals retired Tillman's No. 40 in a ceremony that featured President Bush on the jumbotron on Sept. 19, 2004. But according to one of the Rangers in the second unit, the soldiers also are trained to make certain they know what they are aiming at before they pull the trigger.
"I was always taught: identify, acquire, engage," Arreola said in an interview with ESPN.com. "Identify your target. Acquire it — put your gun sight on it. And if the threat is there, engage. So that is what I did. And that is why I shot up on top of the mountain, knowing that nobody we would give a s--- about is up there. And if anything, the threat is up there."
When asked by ESPN.com whether the other Rangers in the second serial should have known what they were shooting, Arreola said: "Yes, definitely. That is what we are taught. It is burned into our minds." Arreola, who was in the last vehicle of the second serial, told ESPN.com he did not shoot at Tillman or the other Rangers on the ridgeline. Both Arreola and Mansfield were interviewed on Memorial Day of this year at an Orange County (Calif.) jail facility, where they are serving sentences for felony assault for their part in a November 2004 bar fight in Fullerton.
Pat Tillman and other Rangers on the ridgeline frantically waved their arms. Tillman set off a smoke grenade. At one point, the firing ceased briefly when the soldiers in the trailing serial lost sight of their targets as their vehicle rounded a curve. Thinking the firefight was over, Tillman and O'Neal stood to stretch their legs. According to O'Neal's interview transcript from the Army's November 2004 investigation, the two Rangers assumed the shooters had recognized the tragic error.
"So we figured we were fine," O'Neal recalled for investigators. "We figured it was — you know, they realized we were friendly."
But the firing resumed.
This time, someone put three bullets in Tillman's head.
O'Neal's account, again from the Army's documents: "I probably laid down for a minute, you know, just trying to decide what had just happened. And after about then, I started to notice I was hearing some kind of running water sound and then I noticed I was just covered in blood and the blood was just running all over me and, at that time, I knew something was wrong. Probably not even a minute, a minute and a half before I started calling. I looked at Pat and realized he was dead and I called for [redacted] and it probably took a minute and a half, two minutes before they got to my position."
Before they eased off their triggers, the shooters also hit and wounded the platoon leader, Lt. Uthlaut, and his radio telephone operator, Spc. Jade Lane, who were positioned alongside a mud house less than 100 yards down the road.”
“The Global Justice XML Data Model (GJXDM or Global JXDM) is a data reference model for the exchange of information within the justice and public safety communities. The Global JXDM is a product of the Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative's (Global) Infrastructure and Standards Working Group (ISWG), and was developed by the Global ISWG's XML Structure Task Force (XSTF).
The Global JXDM is a comprehensive product that includes a data model, a data dictionary, and an XML schema that together is known as the Global JXDM. Global JXDM is independent of vendors, operating systems, storage media, and applications and is quickly becoming key technology for assisting how criminal and judicial organizations exchange information. The Global JXDM is sponsored by the United States Department of Justice (DOJ), Office of Justice Programs (OJP), with development supported by the Global XML Structure Task Force (GXSTF), which works closely with researchers at the Georgia Tech Research Institute (GTRI). New releases are issued by the GXSTF, which reviews and evaluates each version of the Global JXDM. The GXSTF solicits feedback from technical experts and practitioners in both industry and government and authorizes Global JXDM changes based on this feedback. All approved additions, deletions, and modifications are applied to future releases, with a cumulative change log published along with each release. When a reasonable number of updates are approved by the GXSTF, a new version is released.
The Global JXDM is an XML standard designed specifically for criminal justice information exchanges, providing law enforcement, public safety agencies, prosecutors, public defenders, and the judicial branch with a tool to effectively share data and information in a timely manner. The Global JXDM removes the burden from agencies to independently create exchange standards, and because of its extensibility, there is more flexibility to deal with unique agency requirements and changes. Through the use of a common vocabulary that is understood system-to-system, the Global JXDM enables access from multiple sources and reuse in multiple applications.
History
The federal government has long encouraged criminal justice agencies throughout the country to share information electronically. Historically, however, justice agencies have developed or invested in information systems independently of one another. While the applications that different organizations utilize to manage cases and store important information typically perform very similar functions, they often utilize unique technology or formatting that makes them incompatible with other systems. Consequently, many justice agencies have been forced to resort to inefficient methods of delivering information to each other, such as delivering important filings and documents via the postal service.
In March 2001, the OJP and the DOJ [Marcy’s Pride] sponsored an effort to create a framework for the secure and timely sharing of information across the justice domain. Their objective was to lay the foundation for local, state, tribal, and national interoperability by providing a “common ground” that information systems across the country could use for data exchanges. After a two-year effort, the first prerelease of GJXDM was released in April 2003.
Data Dictionary
When criminal justice agencies share data, they transmit Information Exchange Packages (IEPs) to each other. An IEP is a set of data that is transmitted between agencies for a specific purpose. For example, if a police department wanted the local prosecutor to charge an individual for a crime, the IEP sent from the police department would contain a very specific set of data (victim name, date and time of the offense, etc.) as well as any associated artifacts (dashcam video, 911 audio transcript).”
More to follow.
PresidentialField Mandate
Abel Danger Blog
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