Source: Council on Foreign Affairs
Implications of the Russia-Ukraine War
The Russia-Ukraine war has implications for the Middle East, Europe, and Asia and of course for U.S. foreign policy. In this speech I addressed them briefly.
Blog Post by Elliott Abrams | February 26, 2023
Addressing the Hertog Forum in Tel Aviv on February 24, I summarized my view of the implications of the Russia-Ukraine war on a panel with Natan Sharansky (who addressed Israel's own role). Here is an edited version of my remarks:
This war has told us some important things about international politics, which I'll cover first, and then turn to U.S. policy.
In Europe, the war has certainly concentrated people's minds about defense—and as soon as that happened, NATO and the United States once again emerged as the providers of security for Europe. It's not that the EU has been irrelevant; it has been useful in coordinating European reactions and providing funds to Ukraine. But as has happened repeatedly since 1945, we have seen that Western Europe cannot defend itself and turns to NATO and the Americans. France's efforts to develop an independent European military capability have clearly failed and they have no prospect of success. It seemed briefly a few months ago that Germany would truly change its policy on defense, but the change has been at best partial and is very slow, as we saw when it refused to provide Leopard tanks or even to allow other nations to supply them until it could hide behind the American announcement about Abrams tanks. And even now no one can say when the German tanks will actually be given to Ukraine.
Abrams gives his take on U.S. foreign policy, with special focus on the Middle East and democracy and human rights issues.
The Baltic nations and the East Europeans have turned to NATO and the United States because there is no alternative—and there isn't going to be one. So this is the first point I would make: there is still something called "The West" and it is still led and defended by the United States and its military power. This is as true today as it was when Israel was created in 1948.
I think we can also say that while fear of Russia has risen because of Putin's aggression, respect for Russia has declined.
No one thinks of Russia any more as a first-rate power, on the level of the United States or China. Putin has made it China's junior partner, possessed of one great asset—nuclear weapons—that may not even be useful weapons. Putin’s brief nuclear threats have not much affected European, US, or Ukrainian conduct so far. Russia's poor military performance has changed its position in the world; it is now dependent on Iranian and Chinese weaponry, and Chinese technology. And Putin has managed to devalue deeply what used to be Russia's other great asset—energy. In just one year he has managed to lose Russia's closest and best and richest customers for gas and oil, in Europe, as well as permanently damaging his own economy.
What about the Middle East? Here I would argue that there have been two significant effects of the Ukraine war.
First, because of Russia's troubles in Ukraine there is a growing alliance between Russia and Iran. It started with the export of Iranian drones but may expand to include weapons production inside Russia and export of other munitions. That alliance is of great significance in the context of the Iranian nuclear weapons program. In the past there were moments of considerable unity among the US, China, and Russia and the EU-3 against Iran's nuclear weapons program. This new Russia-Iran alliance has changed that; it is questionable now whether Russia really opposes the Iranian program and how it would react if the UK, France, or Germany tried to invoke snapback, for example.
Second, Russia's debilitated position means that in the Middle East it is devalued as an ally. Is anyone wondering now whether Gen. Sisi will reorient Egypt away from the United States and to Russia? There can of course be cooperation with Russia on certain issues and Putin can send the Wagner Group to fight in small wars, but Russia is no one's idea now of a permanent and valuable ally and world power.
In Asia, one could say Ukraine is far away and the impact of the war is slight—but I think that would be inaccurate. Russia's aggression, and the leadership of the United States to resist it, have added to the impact of China's own aggressive stance under Xi Jinping and have pushed Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia closer to the United States. India too—a country that for decades was closer to Russia. We see a new choreography of coalitions such as the Quad—Australia, India, Japan and the United States—become even more significant. Same for AUKUS, the US-UK-Australia security arrangement.
Please go to Council on Foreign Affairs to continue reading.
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Reading between the lines we can see the Straussian Abrams' condescension for the PMC Wagner Group stating that "Putin can send the Wagner Group to fight in small wars" is almost laughable. The PMC stands at about 50,000 in total including support and logistics. The Wagner PMCs are the shock troops on the Ukrainian military as they have demonstrated in Bahkmut. It is now known the Wagner Group is going from city-to-city in Russia recruiting. That means they are expecting continued war in Ukraine. The proxy war on Russia is "just a small war" with over 200,000 Ukrainian soldiers dead and seriously wounded?
The leadership inside the Straussian sphere controlling the US empire's attempt at hegemonic domination are largely Jewish. To understand the connection of the Straussian operatives to the "Jewish revolutionary spirit" is an important step to begin defusing them:
This is how you protect yourself from an Anglo-Saxon (and Zionist) bioweapon:
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