McConnell claims his sister has killed of silenced whistleblowers since her launch of a radical lesbian organization in the MI-3 Innholders in the late ‘60s and he further alleges that she used U.S. DoJ Asset Forfeiture Funds to procure a Ubilium wireless mesh for 9/11 Malicious Node attacks from an Amec skid unit outside Wedge 1 of the Pentagon and from the WTC#7 18th Floor offices which she shared with her lesbian lover and former EEOC boss, the late Leonara Guarria.
See #1: Abel Danger Mischief Makers - Mistress of the Revels - 'Man-In-The-Middle' Attacks (Revised)
Disambiguation:
MI-3 = Livery Companies’ patent-pool supply-chain protection racket using Privy Purse Forfeiture Fund Marcy (Forfeiture Fund – KPMG Small Business Auction – Liquidation – Prisoner Medical Services – JABS)
+ Inkster (Queen’s Privy Purse – KPMG tax shelter – RCMP Wandering Persons Registry – Escrow fraud)
+ Interpol (Berlin 1942-1945 – Operation Paperclip into Foreign Fugitive File – William Higgitt - Entrust)
+ Intrepid (William Stephenson – GAPAN patent pool – MitM Pearl Harbor attack – Kanada Kommando)
MI-3 = Marine Interruption Intelligence and Investigation unit set up in 1987 to destroy above
McConnell notes that in Book 12 at www.abeldanger.net, agents deployed by his Marine Interruption, Intelligence and Investigations (MI-3) group are mingling in various OODA modes with agents of the Marcy Inkster Interpol Intrepid (MI-3) Livery protection racket based at Skinners’ Hall, Dowgate Hill.
Prequel 1: #1740: Marine Links MI-3 IT Patent Pool to Ubilium Sister Access Card, Karen Hudes Arrest
Karen Hudes Arrested at the World Bank for Whistleblowing
“U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Washington, D.C. 20507
Office of the Chair
September 11, 2011
Dear EEOC Colleagues:
Ten years ago, like so many people across the United States and the globe, I was shocked and sickened to witness the destructive force of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in Northern Virginia, and the fatal crash in Shanksville, Pennsylvania of an airplane en route to an unknown target in Washington, DC. The images of danger and suffering associated with September 11, 2001 are an indelible part of our national memory. As the nation solemnly observes the 10th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, many of us will pause to honor the memories of the victims of this senseless violence and convey condolences to their surviving family members and friends. And of course, the selflessness and bravery of those who risked their own health and safety in order to help others during the attacks must never be forgotten.
I also believe, however, that it is important to remember that countless acts of compassion and courage followed closely behind this unprecedented tragedy, and ultimately helped to restore to survivors and witnesses a measure of faith that we would somehow, someday recover from the grief and loss that we experienced collectively on September 11th. In that spirit, I am taking this opportunity to recall the extraordinary resilience and fortitude of the EEOC employees who worked in offices located near the sites of the attacks, and the compassionate and swift response of EEOC staff across the country who mobilized to support their colleagues in the wake of 9/11.
As many of you know, but those who have come to the EEOC in the past decade may not, in 2001 the EEOC’s New York District Office was located on the 18th floor of building 7 of the World Trade Center complex [the base for an alleged Malicious Node attack structured by the lesbian lovers, Kristine Marcy, then the de facto boss of the U.S. Small Business Administration, and Leonara Guarria, Marcy’s pedophile (?) oppo at the EEOC], only a few hundred yards from the Center’s twin towers. Thanks to the skill and courage of the evacuation team, our employees were safely evacuated from 7 World Trade Center. However, shortly after they made it out of the building, many witnessed firsthand the total destruction of the towers that stood directly across from their offices.
While there were, thankfully, no physical injuries or deaths among our staff, Philadelphia District Office Director Spencer Lewis, who was then serving as Director of the New York District Office, said that the “emotional toll [wa]s unimaginable.” In our Washington, D.C. offices, all employees were safely evacuated after the Pentagon was hit. However, reported threats that other government buildings -- including the White House and Capitol – were slated for attack kept anxiety high in Washington for the entire day, and indeed for a long period after September 11th.
On the afternoon of September 11th, several hours after the collapse of the towers, 7 World Trade Center, the home of our New York District Office, also collapsed. Our employees’ personal effects and all of the agency’s files, ork products and equipment were completely destroyed in the collapse. Incredibly, New York City firefighter John Misha later recovered the agency seal from rubble at the scene of the collapse. The recovered seal remains on display today – battered, yet miraculously intact – in the entry to the New York District Office.
In spite of the catastrophic losses suffered in New York, within days of the attacks, EEOC began the painstaking work of reconstructing files and reproducing the work product that was buried under the rubble of 7 World Trade Center. Significantly, many offices and staff across the country pitched in to ease and expedite the recovery effort.
Intake calls were re-routed to Boston, Massachusetts; temporary offices were housed in Newark, New Jersey; “care packages” were sent from employees in Houston, Texas to their colleagues in New York; and to buoy depressed spirits, EEOC staff across the country sent supportive messages and placed calls to the New York District Office staff.
The remarkable pace of the restoration of normal operations is memorialized in agency press releases: on September 12, 2001 an EEOC press release announced, “EEOC New York Office Destroyed in Terrorist Attack on 131 M Street, N. E., Suite 6NW08F Phone (202) 663-4001 TTY (202) 663-4141 FAX (202) 663-4110 JACQUELINE.BERRIEN@EEOC.GOV”
“Two movements of radical lesbians are known. One was the U.S.-based movement of the mid to late 1960s. The other was the Radical lesbians movement (Front des lesbiennes Radicales), or FLR, which began in France in 1980 and became organized in 1981 under the name Front des lesbiennes Radicales.[1] An offshoot of the latter movement developed shortly after, in the French-speaking province of Quebec, Canada.[2] U.S.-based 1960s movement [edit]
Radical lesbian organizations in the mid to late 1960s in the U.S. were small, well known, and outspoken; among "charismatic" leaders were Rita Mae Brown.[3] Radicalesbians was a group in New York, N.Y.[3] French-based 1980s movement [edit]
Similarities and differences between lesbian separatism and radical lesbianism [edit] The principles of radical lesbianism are similar to those of English-language Lesbian separatism, however, there are some important basic differences.[4][5] In her preface to Monique Wittig's The Straight Mind, Quebec radical lesbian Louise Turcotte explains her views that "Radical lesbians have reached a basic consensus that views heterosexuality as a political regime which must be overthrown."[4] Turcotte notes that Lesbian Separatists "create a new category" (i.e.: separation from men and heterosexual culture)"[4] and that the Radical Lesbian movement aims for the "destruction of the existing framework of heterosexuality as a political regime."[4] Turcotte goes on to discuss Adrienne Rich's landmark essay, Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, noting that Rich describes heterosexuality as a violent political institution that has to be "imposed, managed, organized, propagandized and maintained by force."[6] Rich sees lesbian existence as an act of resistance to this institution, but also as an individual choice, whereas the principles of Radical Lesbianism see lesbianism as necessary, and consider its existence as necessarily outside of the Heterosexual political sphere of influence.[4]
Influence of Monique Wittig[edit]
The FLR, or Radical lesbians, were inspired by the words and writings of French philosopher, Monique Wittig,"[4] and their philosophic inquiries began through the Paris-based group, Questions Feministes.[7] Wittig's 1981 essay, titled after Simone de Beauvoir's observation, One is not Born a Womanposits that Lesbians are not Women; as "what makes a woman is a specific social relation to a man, a relation that we have previously called servitude, a relation which implies personal and physical obligation as well as economic obligation, ... a relation which lesbians escape by refusing to become or to stay heterosexual.[8] Wittig also believed that "lesbianism provides ...the only social form in which (lesbians) can live freely."[9]
In the encyclopedia Who's Who in Lesbian and Gay Writing, editor Gabriele Griffin calls Wittig's writing "part of a larger debate about how heteropatriarchy and women's oppression within it might be resisted."[9] Development of radical lesbian culture in Quebec[edit]
The 1980s and 1990s saw the development of a number of Francophone Lesbian Periodicals in Quebec, Canada, including Amazones D'hier: Lesbiennes D'aujourd'hui, Treize, and L'evidante lesbienne.[10] This was also a period of strength for French-language lesbian presses such as Editions nbj andOblique Editrices, and lesbian bookstores like Montreal's L'Essentielle.[10]”
“Optoelectronics & Communications
Malicious nodes seriously affect the performance of mobile ad hoc networks
Fanzhi Li and Sabah Jassim
Packet delivery ratios in wireless ad hoc networks deteriorate or break significantly with the presence of malicious nodes.
28 July 2006, SPIE Newsroom. DOI: 10.1117/2.1200606.0277
Wireless ad hoc networks are rapidly gaining popularity as a mode of communication, especially among highly mobile sectors of society. A mobile ad hoc network (MANET) is formed with wireless mobile devices (nodes) without the need for existing network infrastructure. As a result, such networks are relatively easy to deploy and use for a very short time, for example, in both personal and business applications.
In addition to providing a convenient mode of communication for civilian and business purposes, wireless ad hoc networks are highly desirable for use in war zones, relief efforts in remote territories, and emergency situations in disaster-stricken areas. In such cases, where no network infrastructure exists, a mobile ad hoc network can provide a crucial mode of communication.
Mobile devices in ad hoc networks communicate with each other through a multi-hop route, using cooperating intermediary nodes. A high level of cooperation is essential for applications that require real-time data transmission, such as soldiers relaying information in a battlefield. However, the limited energy supply of mobile devices raises doubts about the ability of every node to be fully cooperative. As a result, packet delivery cannot be guaranteed even when malicious nodes are not present, and resending data packets does not provide a good solution.
If malicious nodes are present in a MANET, they may attempt to reduce network connectivity (and thereby undermine the network's security) by pretending to be cooperative but in effect dropping any data they are meant to pass on. These actions may result in defragmented networks, isolated nodes, and drastically reduced network performance. We aim to evaluate the added effect of the presence of malicious nodes on ad hoc network performance, and determine appropriate measures to detect malicious nodes.
Instead of creating ad hoc networks with hundreds of physical mobile wireless devices and incurring significant costs, we used the Java in Simulation Time/Scalable Wireless Ad hoc Network Simulator (JiST/SWANS). The simulation experiments examined various network conditions, including node density, mobility speed, transmission power, and geographical distribution of devices. The simulation results demonstrate that the presence of only one malicious node in a MANET can cause an added packet loss of more than 25%. With multiple rogue droppers, nearly 60% of data packets could be lost. In such cases, the presence of malicious nodes have serious security implications.
Standard security solutions adopted for wired networks or structured wireless networks—networks with backbone nodes providing access via physical networks—do not extend naturally to ad hoc networks. Security methods such as public key infrastructure (PKI) and certification typically require a central infrastructure within the network, making them unusable in a MANET. However, the emergence of biometric-based user authentication for mobile devices motivates our investigation of the possible use of biometrics as a security measure for ad hoc networks. In some sensitive applications of MANETs—for example, in battlefields—biometrics could provide a crucial measure of security.
To test the viability of such a solution, we needed to assess the impact of packet dropping on biometric schemes. We tested the robustness of a face verification scheme,1 developed at Buckingham University, against packet dropping. Our experiments showed that there is no noticeable deterioration in the accuracy of the adopted face verification method, even when most of the biometric data is lost or dropped during transmission. This may initially appear to reflect only the robustness of the adopted biometric scheme, but it nevertheless demonstrates the viability of such schemes in securing sensitive ad hoc networks. These results also encourage the use of biometrics as part of the certification component for deployment in ad hoc wireless networks.
In MANET applications where authentication is not essential, there is still a need for mechanisms whereby nodes can be assured that packets will be delivered to their intended destination. To address this need, we are currently investigating the use of ‘creditability-based’ routing tables to detect and isolate malicious nodes. In such a scheme, a node monitors its neighbors and assigns ‘credit scores’ to them according to their observed behavior and ‘credit history.’ Maintaining such a table at each node facilitates the choice of trusted routes rather than the shortest ones, potentially mitigating the packet losses caused by malicious nodes, even when authentication is not used. We are currently implementing this mechanism within the simulation system.
This work was supported in part by the EU FP6 IST contract 001930 (BROADWAN).
Authors
Fanzhi Li and Sabah Jassim
Department of Applied Computing, University of Buckingham Buckingham, UK
Fanzhi Li received his first degree, in thermal engineering, from Xi'an Jiaotong University in China, and an MSc in computing from the University of Buckingham in 2004. He is presently a PhD candidate at the University of Buckingham, investigating how to detect and isolate malicious nodes in wireless networks.
References:
1. H. Sellahewa, S. Jassim, Wavelet-based face verification for constrained platforms,
Proc. SPIE,
Vol: 5779, pp. 173-183, 2005.”
Links:
PresidentialField Mandate
Abel Danger Blog
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