#2104: Marine links Serco Red Switch hack to Invisible Heli-Deck Bomb, Lloyd’s Buffett Super Cat frauds

Plum City - (AbelDanger.net): United States Marine Field McConnell has linked Serco's apparent hack of the U.S. Coast Guard’s Red Switch Network to order a Schlumberger crew to leave the Deepwater Horizon rig without recording a cement bond log, to incendiary bombs, allegedly placed by Serco tagged offenders under the rig’s helideck for the UK-based financial and business services (a.k.a. British Invisibles), and ongoing super cat (catastrophe) insurance frauds by Lloyd’s Register and Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway Group.

McConnell claims that the rectangular helideck hole on the Deepwater Horizon is consistent with the use of sheets of Smacsonic – an incendiary insulator developed for the Invisible elevators in the WTC Twin Towers on 9/11 – which would have damped DH heli-deck vibrations until Serco's Red Switch hackers triggered an incendiary bomb, a gas-pocket explosion and a Lloyd’s Buffett Super Cat fraud.

Prequel 1: #2103: Marine Links Serco Cat, BP Heli-Bomb to Obama Leverage and The Invisibles' Pedo-Ring

Prequel 2: #2098: Marine Links Serco Time-On-Tag Offenders to U.S. Coastguard Red Switch Saboteurs, Deepwater Horizon Cement-Bond Bomb

"Mystery of the Helideck hole on DWH
By BK LimSun
May 6, 2012 3:55 PM
We have all wondered about the helideck hole (shown in picture above). This is another "smoking gun" of the planned Gulf oil spill disaster. We have finally pieced all the Giant Jig-saw puzzle together after 1 1/2 years of pains-taking investigations. Not to mention the abuses by the schills and trolls, character assassinations, physical assassinations, numerous cointelpro, dis-info bombs thrown in our way."

"The Deepwater Horizon oil spill (also referred to as the BP oil spill, the BP oil disaster, the Gulf of Mexico oil spill, and theMacondo blowout) began on 20 April 2010 in the Gulf of Mexico on the BP-operated Macondo Prospect. It claimed eleven lives[6][7][8][9]and is considered the largest accidental marine oil spill in the history of the petroleum industry, an estimated 8% to 31% larger in volume than the previously largest, the Ixtoc I oil spill. Following the explosion and sinking of the Deepwater Horizon oil rig, a sea-flooroil gusher flowed for 87 days, until it was capped on 15 July 2010.[8][10] The US Government estimated the total discharge at 4.9 million barrels (210 million US gal; 780,000 m3).[3] After several failed efforts to contain the flow, the well was declared sealed on 19 September 2010.[11] Some reports indicate the well site continues to leak.[12][13]
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The National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling released a final report on 5 January 2011.[298][299] The panel found that BP, Halliburton, and Transocean had attempted to work more cheaply and thus helped to trigger the explosion and ensuing leakage.[300] The report stated that "whether purposeful or not, many of the decisions that BP, Halliburton, and Transocean made that increased the risk of the Macondo blowout clearly saved those companies significant time (and money)."[300] BP released a statement in response to this, saying, that "even prior to the conclusion of the commission's investigation, BP instituted significant changes designed to further strengthen safety and risk management."[301] Transocean, however, blamed BP for making the decisions before the actual explosion occurred and government officials for permitting those decisions.[302] Halliburton stated that it was acting only upon the orders of BP when it injected the cement into the wall of the well.[301][303] It criticized BP for its failure to run a cement bond log test.[302] In the report, BP was accused of nine faults.[301][303] One was that it had not used a diagnostic tool to test the strength of the cement.[300] Another was ignoring a pressure test that had failed.[301] Still another was for not plugging the pipe with cement.[300] The study did not, however, place the blame on any one of these events. Rather, it concluded that "notwithstanding these inherent risks, the accident of April 20 was avoidable" and that "it resulted from clear mistakes made in the first instance by BP, Halliburton and Transocean, and by government officials who, relying too much on industry's assertions of the safety of their operations, failed to create and apply a program of regulatory oversight that would have properly minimized the risk of deepwater drilling."[301][303] The panel also noted that the government regulators did not have sufficient knowledge or authority to notice these cost-cutting decisions.[300]"

"How Berkshire Built a Super-Cat Powerhouse
By Emil Lee | More Articles August 29, 2007 | Comments (0)
As of 2006, Berkshire Hathaway (NYSE: BRK-A ) (NYSE: BRK-B ) wrote the third-largest amount of net premiums in the reinsurance industry -- an amazing feat for a firm that started out making textiles. One of the key foundations of Berkshire's reinsurance business is its super-catastrophe line, and the company's annual shareholder letters offer an incredibly valuable case study of that segment's success. Let's take a closer look at the integral components of Berkshire's reinsurance division.
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Security: In Berkshire we trust Lastly, Berkshire's Fort Knox-like balance sheet makes it one of only eight U.S. companies to earn an AAA credit rating. The only other such firm that wrote insurance, General Electric(NYSE: GE ) , sold that portion of its business to Swiss Re.

A sterling credit rating reassures customers that Berkshire will be able to pay even under the most stressful conditions. Since Berkshire specializes in ultra-large risks, customers are extra-careful to do business only with insurers they know will pay up.

Although it wasn't in the super-cat area, a good example of this caution came when Lloyds wanted to get rid of its asbestos liability. The backers for those liabilities were Lloyd's "Names," a group of unfortunate wealthy individuals who agreed to take on insurance risks in exchange for a cut of the profits. A while back, those Names got blindsided by an avalanche of asbestos and environmental liabilities, a disaster that threatened Lloyds' very existence.

Asbestos liabilities have haunted the Names for more than a decade. They've begged for an end to the suffering, and many have stated, "I just want to sleep easy." Recently, Lloyd's turned to a reinsurer they knew would be able to make payments for decades to come. As the CEO of Equitas, the Lloyd's unit that assumed the liability, stated after transferring the risk to Berkshire, "We think we have just bought [the Names] the world's best mattress."

That sounds like a customer much more concerned with security than price, and it helps to explain how Berkshire continues to use its competitive advantages of speed, size, and security to build its super-cat reinsurance moat.

Berkshire has used similarly astute strategies to build enormously valuable competitive advantages in all of its insurance lines. That's one of the primary reasons why many investors are betting that Berkshire's intrinsic value far exceeds its current share price. Like Berkshire's nervous super-cat customers, it seems we'll have to spin the wheel and see how that bet turns out."

Yours sincerely,



Field McConnell, United States Naval Academy, 1971; Forensic Economist; 30 year airline and 22 year military pilot; 23,000 hours of safety; Tel: 715 307 8222

David Hawkins Tel: 604 542-0891 Forensic Economist; former leader of oil-well blow-out teams; now sponsors Grand Juries in CSI Crime and Safety Investigation