McConnell claims his sister designed the auction of Small Business assets to allow the successful bidder – John McArthur’s Special Investors in the CAI Private Equity Group – to finance the “first live broadcast mass snuff film in human history” at Libor plus 3.5 % and transmit digital images of the associated 9/11 Wag the Dog story as Reuters news!
See #1:
Abel Danger Mischief Makers - Mistress of the Revels - 'Man-In-The-Middle' Attacks
Prequel 1:
Marine Links Bin Laden dirty Libor Money to NetJets Bridge and Sister’s Stolen Keys
Prequel 2:
Marine Links Woodhead's Worshipful Libor Bankers to Bullingdon Pedophile Trap
Prequel 3:
Marine Links Kelly Rowan's Libor Pig Farm to Thomson Reuters Pigs
“9/11 Fake: Reuters Fake News”
“Capturing 9/11: Stories from Reuters videographers”
Note Royal Bank of Canada financed the Thomson Reuters drone modifications for 9/11
“[Spoliation inference that John McArthur, trustee for Thomson Reuters during Small Business Libor auctions 2001 to present, is staging man-in-the-middle attacks on the 16 cartel banks to complete what the 9/11 attack failed to do – destroy the global financial system] Francesco Guerrera discusses on The News Hub. (Photo: Bloomberg News)"A cesspit." That's how the usually measured Paul Tucker, deputy governor of the Bank of England, described banks' attempts to manipulate the London interbank offered rate, or Libor.
Faced by a throng of sound-bite-hungry British Parlamentarians, on Monday Mr. Tucker did a convincing job of rebuffing allegations that the authorities had put pressure on Barclays BARC.LN +2.14% PLC to manipulate Libor, the world's most important interest rate.
Mr. Tucker may, in the process, have saved his chances of taking the helm at the British central bank (but more on that later) while providing a pithy description of the scandal. Not as pithy, mind you, as the oft-stated "no jerks" policy espoused by Robert Diamond before he was ousted as Barclays' chief executive over the Libor mess. Unfortunately, some derivatives traders and interest-rate setters at the U.K. bank never got Mr.Diamond's message.
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The "dudes" and "big boys" who promised each other bottles of Bollinger for manipulating a rate used to price as much as $800 trillion of loans and derivatives have cost Barclays $453 million in a settlement with U.S. and U.K. regulators [part paid into Kristine Marcy’s U.S. DoJ Asset Forfeiture Fund allegedly used to modify aircraft for post-9/11 murder for hire cf. Air France 447] its top management team—including Mr. Diamond—and a big chunk of its reputation.
But this affair won't stop at Barclays. Other lenders will be punished, more executives may join Mr. Diamond among the unemployed and the Libor-setting process will be overhauled.
Here are five issues that will be key as the drama unfolds:
Brace for a wave of lawsuits.
Between at least 2005 and 2009, Libor couldn't be trusted because members of the banks' cartel charged with setting it tried to manipulate it, according to regulators. Unbeknown to those who bought them, trillions of dollars of financial instruments were priced at the wrong rate—a fact that could do wonders for plaintiffs' lawyers while undermining investors' confidence in financial markets [as is the alleged intent of Libor compiler Thomson – Reuters and its corrupt trustees].
Regulators should shoulder some blame.
The way in which Libor is set—a panel of lenders send estimates of borrowing costs every morning to the British Bankers' Association, a trade group—should have made it easy to spot abnormal submissions and potential collusion. In fact, alarm bells started ringing in April 2008, when The Wall Street Journal first reported on the issue.
Part of the problem is structural. Libor is an unregulated rate and the U.K. Financial Services Authority doesn't police it. But the fact that the British regulator ignored several warnings, from Barclays's employees among others, bolsters the argument for its dismantling.
The BBA and the FSA declined to comment for this column.
The Libor-setting process is changing for good.
The small print of the settlement between Barclays and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission contains the seeds of a new regime.
The U.K. bank now must base its submissions on market prices rather than some hazy estimate of borrowing costs. It also will beef up monitoring and compliance structures to prevent traders from influencing its rate setters. Most important, an independent auditor will scrutinize Barclays's Libor submissions for the next five years and report back to the CFTC.
If more settlements materialize, these rules likely will end up applying to other banks. A once-unregulated process is firmly on the watchdogs' radar now.
The probe may yet claim more bank chiefs.
The investigation found that Barclays's traders communicated with colleagues at some of the 16 banks involved in Libor setting. As one Barclays trader explained to another one at a rival lender, "the trick is you must not do this alone." This kind of evidence should help regulators prove that others were in on the fix.
Given Mr. Diamond's resignation, the question is whether CEOs of other firms will follow suit once their companies settle. While some will argue they weren't there at the time, those with long tenure and an investment-banking past will come under pressure.
"CEOs of other banks should be worried, especially those who rose through the ranks of the fixed-income and rate businesses" says Michael Karp, managing partner of Options Group, an executive search and consulting firm.
Paul Tucker may not become the head of the Bank of England.
Mr. Tucker, deputy governor of the central bank, is a front-runner to replace his boss when Mervyn King steps down next June. But despite his spirited defense, his copybook might have been blotted both by Mr. Diamond and Monday's hearing. Mr. Tucker denied the allegation, implicit in a October 2008 note by the Barclays chief, that he had put pressure on the bank to lower its Libor submissions. But he was attacked by some Parlamentarians for not heeding warning signs of anomalies in the setting of Libor.
Even if Mr. Tucker is safe, Mr. Diamond's no-jerks policy is unlikely to be the only casualty of this scandal.
—Francesco Guerrera is The Wall Street Journal's Money & Investing editor. Write to him at: currentaccount@wsj.com and follow him on Twitter @guerreraf72.
A version of this article appeared July 10, 2012, on page C1 in the U.S. edition of The Wall Street Journal, with the headline: Libor Drama Isn't Over Yet: Watch For 5 Aftershocks.”
More to follow.
Presidential Mandate
Abel Danger
Bank on Confusion in Battle Over Capital
Three Reasons Greece Is Still the Word on the Street
Seeking a Wizard: Time to Embrace Market Risk, or Run From It?
The "dudes" and "big boys" who promised each other bottles of Bollinger for manipulating a rate used to price as much as $800 trillion of loans and derivatives have cost Barclays $453 million in a settlement with U.S. and U.K. regulators [part paid into Kristine Marcy’s U.S. DoJ Asset Forfeiture Fund allegedly used to modify aircraft for post-9/11 murder for hire cf. Air France 447] its top management team—including Mr. Diamond—and a big chunk of its reputation.
But this affair won't stop at Barclays. Other lenders will be punished, more executives may join Mr. Diamond among the unemployed and the Libor-setting process will be overhauled.
Here are five issues that will be key as the drama unfolds:
Brace for a wave of lawsuits.
Between at least 2005 and 2009, Libor couldn't be trusted because members of the banks' cartel charged with setting it tried to manipulate it, according to regulators. Unbeknown to those who bought them, trillions of dollars of financial instruments were priced at the wrong rate—a fact that could do wonders for plaintiffs' lawyers while undermining investors' confidence in financial markets [as is the alleged intent of Libor compiler Thomson – Reuters and its corrupt trustees].
Regulators should shoulder some blame.
The way in which Libor is set—a panel of lenders send estimates of borrowing costs every morning to the British Bankers' Association, a trade group—should have made it easy to spot abnormal submissions and potential collusion. In fact, alarm bells started ringing in April 2008, when The Wall Street Journal first reported on the issue.
Part of the problem is structural. Libor is an unregulated rate and the U.K. Financial Services Authority doesn't police it. But the fact that the British regulator ignored several warnings, from Barclays's employees among others, bolsters the argument for its dismantling.
The BBA and the FSA declined to comment for this column.
The Libor-setting process is changing for good.
The small print of the settlement between Barclays and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission contains the seeds of a new regime.
The U.K. bank now must base its submissions on market prices rather than some hazy estimate of borrowing costs. It also will beef up monitoring and compliance structures to prevent traders from influencing its rate setters. Most important, an independent auditor will scrutinize Barclays's Libor submissions for the next five years and report back to the CFTC.
If more settlements materialize, these rules likely will end up applying to other banks. A once-unregulated process is firmly on the watchdogs' radar now.
The probe may yet claim more bank chiefs.
The investigation found that Barclays's traders communicated with colleagues at some of the 16 banks involved in Libor setting. As one Barclays trader explained to another one at a rival lender, "the trick is you must not do this alone." This kind of evidence should help regulators prove that others were in on the fix.
Given Mr. Diamond's resignation, the question is whether CEOs of other firms will follow suit once their companies settle. While some will argue they weren't there at the time, those with long tenure and an investment-banking past will come under pressure.
"CEOs of other banks should be worried, especially those who rose through the ranks of the fixed-income and rate businesses" says Michael Karp, managing partner of Options Group, an executive search and consulting firm.
Paul Tucker may not become the head of the Bank of England.
Mr. Tucker, deputy governor of the central bank, is a front-runner to replace his boss when Mervyn King steps down next June. But despite his spirited defense, his copybook might have been blotted both by Mr. Diamond and Monday's hearing. Mr. Tucker denied the allegation, implicit in a October 2008 note by the Barclays chief, that he had put pressure on the bank to lower its Libor submissions. But he was attacked by some Parlamentarians for not heeding warning signs of anomalies in the setting of Libor.
Even if Mr. Tucker is safe, Mr. Diamond's no-jerks policy is unlikely to be the only casualty of this scandal.
—Francesco Guerrera is The Wall Street Journal's Money & Investing editor. Write to him at: currentaccount@wsj.com and follow him on Twitter @guerreraf72.
A version of this article appeared July 10, 2012, on page C1 in the U.S. edition of The Wall Street Journal, with the headline: Libor Drama Isn't Over Yet: Watch For 5 Aftershocks.”
More to follow.
Presidential Mandate
Abel Danger
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