Oslo - NATO’s Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) - Norwegian ‘Web of Trust’ Breached - Extorted Root Authorities - Pedophile Oath-Taking Ceremonies

To whom it may concern

July 23, 2011

NATO PKI, Norway Web of Trust breached by Bullingdon pedophile oath?

Abel Danger infers from the M.O. of the bombings in Oslo and Oklahoma City that NATO’s Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and Norwegian ‘Web of Trust’ have been breached by extorted root authorities witnessed at pedophile oath-taking ceremonies of a kind allegedly developed at Oxford University’s Bullingdon Club (founded in 1780).

Prequel
US Congress: Letter of Marque and Reprisal Requested - Mozilla-Compatible Patented Devices - Captured Airline Supply Chains - 911 Contract Hit

Bullingdon BBC/Al Jazeera's MitM .tv


See #1 and #2
Abel Danger Mischief Makers - Mistress of the Revels - 'Man-In-The-Middle' Attacks

PKI Services Canary Wharf uses Bullingdon oath takers as root authorities

If everyone is a friend, anyone is a friend

Bullingdon control of root authorities for Matrix 5 propaganda on tv

PKI and Web of Bullingdon Trust provides hot links to a cold case

PKI and Web of Bullingdon Trust provides hot links to a cold case

“The Name of the Beast “You have asked me if I knew the name of the assassin. I do. The mere knowing of his name is a small thing, however, compared with the power of laying our hands upon him.” Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, ``A Study in Scarlet'', Holmes speaking”

“[Evidence Oslo/OKC crime scene investigations handled through compromised root authorities by NATO Entrust PKI and Matrix 5 communities to ensure guilty go free] Oslo bombing evokes memories of Timothy McVeigh Oklahoma City attack By Mirror.co.uk 23/07/2011 The bombing of the government building in Oslo has evoked memories of Timothy McVeigh's attack on the Oklahoma City federal building 16 years ago. The explosion at the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building on April 19, 1995 killed 168 people and injured more than 600. McVeigh was convicted on federal murder charges and executed in 2001. McVeigh's Army friend, Terry Nichols, was convicted on federal and state bombing-related charges and is serving multiple life sentences at a federal prison in Colorado. McVeigh was stopped on Interstate 35 by Oklahoma highway patrol trooper Charlie Hanger on the day of the bombing because his 1977 Mercury Marquis did not have a licence plate. Hanger went on to be elected sheriff of Noble County, Oklahoma, in 2004. McVeigh, a US Army veteran and security guard, was 26 when he carried out the attack by detonating a lorry bomb outside the building.

It was said to be the deadliest act of terrorism within the United States before the September 11, 2001 attacks. McVeigh was seeking revenge against the federal government for the way it handled the siege at Waco in Texas, which ended in the deaths of 76 people exactly two years earlier. The siege had begun in February 1993 when the US Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives tried to execute a search warrant at a ranch run by the Branch Davidian religious sect at Mount Carmel, near Waco. A gun battle broke out in which four agents and six Branch Davidians were killed. A siege was initiated by the FBI , which ended 50 days later when a second assault on the compound was made and a fire destroyed it. McVeigh drove to Waco during the crisis to show his support for those under siege. He distributed pro-gun rights literature and bumper stickers, such as "When guns are outlawed, I will become an outlaw".”

“To support Intra-NATO and NATO-To-Nations communications, NATO is developing a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) called NATO PKI (NPKI). This NPKI will be a framework that will be made up of services that provide for the management of public key certificates, which in turn can enable secure communications based on integrity and authenticity/authentication among NATO organisations and between NATO and other organisations and countries .. The first NATO PKI Ad-hoc working group was hosted in April 1998. The PKI for the NU/NR network is operational since Q4 2006. NCSA is hosting the PKI for the NS network since 2010. In 2011 NCSA will host the PKI for the NATO Messaging System (NMS), this specific PKI is dedicated for the NMS and will only provide PKI services during NMS phase 1. All present NPKI systems are considered an interim solution, NC3A is developing a cost estimate for the definite NPKI. Currently NATO is working on the implementation of the NATO ROOT CA certificate in the Microsoft ROOT CA program. This program automatically inserts the NATO ROOT CA certificate in the appropriate certificate store on an end-users terminal. This delivers users a secure access to NATO web sites (which are secured with a NATO Secure Socket Layer (SSL) certificate). What is SSL? SSL provides an encrypted tunnel between the end-users terminal and the web server. In order to provide secure communication between the end-user terminal and a NATO secured web site before the Microsoft ROOT CA program is effective NCSA has come up with an interim solution. Please click on the "Installing NATO ROOT CA Certifcate" button and follow the instructions.”

“News Releases Norway's Largest Financial Services Organization Selects Entrust Zero-Touch Fraud Detection Solution DnB NOR known for strong security, strengthens commitment to protect customers PRNewswire-FirstCall DALLAS (NASDAQ:ENTU)
Jul 29, 2008 DALLAS, July 29 /PRNewswire-FirstCall/ -- DnB NOR, the largest financial institution in Norway, is one of the region's few financial services organizations that has not suffered significant loss from identity theft or related fraud. To elevate that standard, prevent fraud and protect the identities of customers online, DnB NOR aligned their comprehensive security strategy with Entrust, Inc. (NASDAQ: ENTU) and the zero-touch fraud detection component of the Entrust Risk-based Authentication Solution. "Our organization's goal was to implement a seamless fraud detection strategy that wouldn't require invasive integration with back-end applications -- this solution enabled us to do just that," said Sofie Nystrom, Chief Information Security Officer at DnB NOR. "The fact that we could keep all of our data in-house -- versus shipping it offsite -- was an important capability. This initiative perfectly aligns with our strong commitment to online security for our customers." As key components of the Entrust Risk-based Authentication Solution, DnB NOR will leverage the real-time fraud detection and historical analysis capabilities of Entrust. These tools, coupled with critical data from the Entrust Open Fraud Intelligence Network (OFIN), help protect consumer online transactions from fraud. These capabilities enable organizations to collect data to help identify current and future potential fraud attacks before they happen -- all in real-time. With total assets of more than $308 billion (USD), DnB NOR serves more than 2.5 million customers worldwide. The bank will leverage the Entrust solution -- for more than 1.7 million users -- to protect private-, corporate- and consumer-banking customers online. "As one of the largest financial services groups in the Nordic region, DnB NOR had a high security standard for their customers, shareholders and brand image," said Entrust Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer Bill Conner. "The zero-touch fraud detection capability not only helps meet their current security objectives, but allows them to study key fraud data to help prevent fraud attacks in the future and potentially address them before they even occur. This is a proactive strategy for a financial institution already known for stringent, yet non-invasive, security solutions and policies." The Entrust Open Fraud Intelligence Network is an information-sharing service designed to help combat online fraud by consolidating and sharing key fraud behavior patterns and data among network participants. It is focused on providing participating members the latest fraud behaviors and tactics, as well as key data for helping to detect and combat fraud as it evolves. The Entrust Open Fraud Intelligence Network is a key component of Entrust's layered security architecture. Established as Christiania Sparebank in 1822, DnB NOR [OSE: DNBNOR] is Norway's largest financial services group with total combined assets of more than $308 billion (USD). The group's current name stems from a 2003 merger between Den norske Bank (DnB) and Gjensidige NOR. Today, the group consists of strong brands such as DnB NOR, Vital, Nordlandsbanken, Cresco, Postbanken, DnB NORD and Carlson. Represented in more than 20 countries, DnB NOR services 2.3 million retail customers and 198,000 corporate accounts. The group also operates Norway's largest Internet banks -- dnbnor.no and postbanken.no -- by servicing more than 1.4 million users. About Entrust Entrust (NASDAQ: ENTU) secures digital identities and information for consumers, enterprises and governments in more than 1,700 organizations spanning 60 countries. Leveraging a layered security approach to address growing risks, Entrust solutions help secure the most common digital identity and information protection pain points in an organization. These include SSL, authentication, fraud detection, shared data protection and e-mail security. For information, call 888-690-2424, e-mail entrust@entrust.com or visit http://www.entrust.com/.”

“Managing the Root List The only defence proffered for this is the control of the root list, which amounts to shifting the burden to some hand-waving process for making sure all CAs are good; a defence that is as useless as it is revealing in its ignorance of the real world, not to mention agency and contract theory. It is somewhat unclear why this state of affairs exists, but the SSL community seems strongly in support of the principle of "all CAs are equal." Consider the recent efforts by the Mozilla Foundation, manufacturer and publisher of the newly popular browser, FireFox, to address and revise the Root list. Their policy has succeeded in exposing fault lines of the "all CAs are equal" simply by asking how one tells. By initial programmer consensus, the view included at least the notion of a WebTrust audit. But this is clearly inadequate to all purposes as such a thing is very expensive. It is not available across a wide range of countries and other circumstances, and thus by definition it is too expensive for some purposes and too cheap for others. Further, WebTrust itself may be little more than additional smoke and mirrors. Its stated mission is to verify that the CA is doing what it says it is doing. This is obviously circular, and does not support the widespread public belief that a WebTrust in some sense "trustworthy." By way of example, an ISP could create its own CA for the purpose of MITMing all of its clients, state that in its terms and conditions, and get a WebTrust audit to confirm it! These revelations have raised the notion that a WebTrust may not only be insufficient for induction into the root list, but also potentially optional. This presents every browser manufacturer with a quandary of reliance; if the WebTrust cannot be relied upon to ensure the fitness of the CA according to the browser's metrics, then the browser must take back responsibility. Special Interests The implementation of any PKI system on a wide scale is subject to the capture or influence by special interests. Commercial interests that place revenue in advance of a workable model were discussed above. Governmental Interests Attempts have been made and have at times succeeded in perverting a system to Government policy interests. Such goals include citizen's identity cards, key escrow, and centralised control of user data such as health data. Britain especially has been morally lax in attempting to employ her citizens' Internet as a method to track and trace them: "And the suspicion inevitably remains that [British] Government's continuing enthusiasm for these castles in the air derives mainly from its hope that from among them may emerge (free from cost or blame to Government) a citizen's identity card. Convenient for Government as such a development would be (because Government typically needs to assign a unique identifier to each citizen to avoid multiple claims for social security benefits or tax reliefs, for example), Government's wish to portray the solution to its own problems as being promoted for the benefit of electronic commerce as a whole continues to be profoundly counter-productive." If the agenda includes using PKI, the CAs and certificates as means of projecting a control policy, the following signs may be evident: Legislation that makes it a crime to 'interfere' with a signing/encryption device (even your own), The device is not 'owned' by the user, but rather the supplier. Pressure to implement 'qualified certificates' in exchange for favourable legal presumptions, an inducement of dubious value when accompanied by mandatory compliance regimes, the burden of potential personal criminality, and constant policy surveillance, etc. Reserving the market for Certificate Authorities and digital signatures to a restricted and/or controlled sector such as banks or notaries. Providing two security environments: a weak one for one group and a strong one for another group [allegedly including Bullingdon pedophile oath takers], or distinct regimes for encryption and for signatures .. http://iang.org/ssl/pki_considered_harmful.html”

“THE HOTTEST CURRY AND A PINT OF MAGGOTS An age-old part of student life, initiation ceremonies have always had the power to shock. But where past generations might have sunk yards of ale or indulged in sponge fights, the rituals of today are far more alarming. Guzzling alcohol until you pass out and humiliating yourself are a common feature. Nor is such behaviour a male preserve any more. Joining the Alley Catz, a female drinking society for sportswomen at St Catharine's College, Cambridge, involves drinking until you are so paralytic that you vomit or collapse. Their rituals also include being smeared with chocolate and eating a Mars bar out of men's underpants. New members of the equivalent male club at St Catharine's, the Kittens, are forced to eat a phall, the hottest curry available, and then are given cat food to eat, washed down with copious amounts of alcohol. Recruits to the notorious Bullingdon Club, a male only drinking society with a history of vandalism made up of some of Oxford University's wealthiest students, have their university digs 'trashed' as part of their initiation. Past members include David Cameron and Boris Johnson. At the Mornie Onion Society, a drinking club for the sporting elite of Fitzwilliam College, Cambridge, the initiation ceremony consisted of drinking a yard of ale with an onion floating on top, while naked or wearing only a towel when Culture Secretary Andy Burnham was a member in the 1980s. Until it was banned in 2006, first-year vets at Bristol University took part in the infamous 'treasure hunt' – an initiation which included drinking pints of maggots and crawling through muddy streams. It reduced some to tears.”

Those who may be concerned have a moral obligation to think hard.

http://www.abeldanger.net/