Con Air* = U.S. Justice Prisoner and Alien Transportation System launched in 1994 by McConnell sister, Kristine Marcy
McConnell claims that Cameron and Serco's National Security Adviser Maureen Baginski converted ownership of the ISIS battlespace and the Red Switch Network from the National Command Authority in the Oval Office – Barack Obama – to an Airbus PFI at RAF Oakhanger and have left control of the White House Situation Room to tagged (?) pedophiles recruited through the White House Council on Women and Girls under Valerie Jarrett and Chicago's Down Low Club.
McConnell also claims that Cameron and Baginski arranged for Serco's Red Switch phones to be removed from the Oval Office Desk and the White House Situation Room so that even if Barack Obama was capable of recognizing a man-in-the-middle attack by the Airbus PFI, he could not override the Wag the Dog Script developed for the ISIS pedophiles by his erstwhile associates at the Down Low Club and their counterparts in the Westminster pedophile ring.
McConnell recommends that Serco shares be suspended until Abel Danger has completed its investigation into Cameron and Baginski's apparent transfer of Red Switch Override privileges for pedophile commanders of the ISIS battlespace from Obama’s Oval Office to the Airbus PFI at RAF Oakhanger.
Prequel 1: #2140 Marine Links Con Air Sister Override to Serco's Red Switch Boeing Hijacks, Cake Boy’s Oval Office Phones
Prequel 2: #2117: Marine Links Auld Alliance of Red Switch Serco Power in Glasgow Yes to Katrina Waypoint and Clutha Crash
PFI: An Introduction - Financial Strategy and Private Finance Initiative (1/11)
Trailer - Con Air (1997)
Serco... Would you like to know more?
"All warfare is based on deception. Hence, when we are able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must appear inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near."
"Battlespace is a term used to signify a unified military
strategy to integrate and combine armed
forces for the military theatre
of operations, including air, information, la
"The PFI is ultimately a kind of project finance, a form of private
sector delivery of infrastructure that has been used since the Middle Ages.
However, the pedigree of the current private finance initiative (PFI) was in
Australia in the late 1980s.
In 1992 PFI was implemented for the first time in the UK by [David
Cameron and Norman Lamont in] the Conservative government of John Major. It
immediately proved controversial, and was attacked by the Labour
Party while in opposition. Labour critics such as the
future Cabinet Minister & Deputy Leader of the Labour
Party, Harriet Harman, considered that PFI was really a
back-door form of privatisation (House of Commons, 7 December 1993),
and the future Chancellor of the Exchequer, Alistair
Darling, warned that "apparent savings now could be countered by the
formidable commitment on revenue expenditure in years to come".[8] For
several years the number and value of PFI contracts were small. Nonetheless,
the Treasury considered
the scheme advantageous and pushed Tony Blair's
Labour government to adopt it after the 1997 General Election. Two
months after the party took office, the Health Secretary, Alan
Milburn, announced that "when there is a limited amount of
public-sector capital available, as there is, it's PFI or bust".[8] PFI
expanded considerably in 1996 and then expanded much further under Labour,[9] resulting
in criticism from many trade unions, elements of the Labour Party, the Scottish National Party (SNP), and the Green Party,[10] as
well as commentators such as George
Monbiot. Proponents of the PFI include the World Bank, IMF and (in the UK)
the CBI.[11]"
"The Joint Services Command and Staff College
In the uncertain
conditions of the early 21st Century, the demands on the modern military call for all members of the profession to have high levels of political awareness, independence of thought and intellectual skill. The function of command and staff training is to develop those characteristics in all students, both fromhome and abroad. The Defence Studies Department is accordingly responsible for
academic support at the Joint Services Command and Staff College, whichrelocated in August 2000 to Shrivenham (twenty miles west of Oxford), adjacentto the Defence College of Management & Technology (DCMT), and the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC). King's forms part of a Serco-led team there within the overall Private Finance Initiative consortium under Defence Management (Watchfield) Ltd, who designed, built and now run this purpose-built facility. The Shrivenham community thus embodies an outstanding concentration of defence expertise and in April 2002 this was formally
recognised by the creation of the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, a military and academic community that provides professional and personal development to some 11,600 students per year, now headed by Lt Gen Sir John Kiszely KCB MC. The Academy brings together the JSCSC, the DCMT, the Royal College of Defence Studies (RCDS) in London and theArmed Forces Chaplaincy Centre (AFCC), and also includes the Advanced Research and Assessment Group (ARAG) and the Conflict Studies Research Centre (CSRC), both based at
Shrivenham. The Academy thus represents a concentration of the key providers of military staff training and education and is intended to inform Ministry of Defence thinking and policy
The main component of the JSCSC is the one year Advanced Command and Staff Course (ACSC) for over 300 selected British and foreign officers normally in their mid to late 30s. There are also other shorter courses, including the three-month Higher Command and
Staff Course for senior officers and several intermediate single service staff training courses. In September 2004 the new Intermediate Command and Staff Course (Land) was introduced for 230 Army officers, and since September 06 this course has run twice yearly with up to 205 students in each cohort. Total
student throughput at Shrivenham currently exceeds 2,000 officers per year and is expected to rise further. Further details about the JSCSC may be found at www.da.mod.uk.
The JSCSC has a full complement of military Directing Staff, who work together in team teaching with the academics in DSD. DSD staff also run the MA in Defence Studies programme (now taken by around half the ACSC students), and they engage in individual research in order to facilitate course development and to maintain their own specialisms."
"Westminster paedophile ring claims: '20 top figures involved'
Former child
protection manager says even greater number knew about abuse and did nothing
about it
At least 20 prominent
figures are believed to be among a "powerful elite" of paedophiles
who abused children for "decades", according to a former child
protection manager.
Police were said to be
investigating more than ten current and former politicians over alleged child
abuse, but Peter McKelvie told BBC
Newsnight: "I would say we are looking at upwards of 20 and a much
larger number of people who have known about it and done nothing about
it."
McKelvie, whose
allegations led to the 2012 police inquiry, said he had spoken to many male
victims who had been subjected to the "worst form of abuse",
including rape, when they were children.
His comments came just
hours after Home Secretary Theresa May announced a wide-ranging inquiry into
historical sex abuse claims. Parliament, the police, schools, churches and the
BBC will be among those subjected to the investigation, which will have the same
legal status as the Hillsborough inquiry and will not report until after next
year's general election.
Several MPs have
complained that the inquiry will not be led by a judge with the power to summon
witnesses and seize papers. Conservative MP Mark Reckless told the Daily Mirror he would therefore be surprised if
suspected paedophiles facing criminal prosecutions would co-operate without a
judge at its helm.
According to The Guardian, the inquiry will be able to examine files
from the security services and the Tory whips' office, which is rumoured to
have suppressed allegations of child abuse in the 1970s.
Labour MPs pointed to
footage from a 1995 BBC documentary in which Tim Fortescue, a senior whip in
Sir Edward Heath's government from 1970-73, boasted he could cover up a scandal
"involving small boys".
Meanwhile, Peter
Wanless, the chief executive of the NSPCC, will also carry out a smaller
inquiry into whether there was a cover-up of abuses within the Home Office. He
will examine an internal review carried out last year into the department's
files relating to organised child sex abuse from 1979 to 1999.
He will also study
another Home Office investigation, released last night, which concluded that
the department gave six-figure grants to two organisations linked to the
Paedophile Information Exchange."
Members of the
all-women al-Khanssaa Brigade in Raqqa, Syria, are running brothels for Islamic
State murderers
British female jihadis
are running brothels full of women kidnapped and forced into sex slavery by Islamic State militants.
It is understood they
are members of an ultra-religious IS 'police' force tasked with looking after girls
captured from the Yazidi tribe in Iraq.
As many as 3,000 Iraqi
women have been taken captive in the last two weeks by the terror group.
Sources suggest that
members of the all-women al-Khanssaa Brigade in Raqqa, Syria, are running
brothels to satisfy the fighters' desires."
"Support to British military satellite communications was outsourced to EADS Astrium [Airbus] subsidiary company Paradigm Secure
Communications in 2003 in a Private Finance
Initiative arrangement. The
station was subsequently decommissioned, closed and handed over to Paradigm at
that time. Paradigm Secure Communications is now known as Astrium
Services.
The three sites are
now designated Telemetry & Command Station Oakhanger, Satellite Ground
Station Oakhanger and Satellite Ground Terminal F4 (operated on behalf of NATO). The sites are
now used to support the Skynet 5 constellation."
"ANALYSIS
The 'unknown unknowns' of confronting ISIS in Iraq
The lack of credible
military intelligence about ISIS is like what it was about the Taliban
One of this country's
most experienced journalists and foreign correspondents, Brian Stewart is
currently a Distinguished Senior Fellow at the Munk School for Global Affairs
at the University of Toronto. He also sits on the advisory board of Human
Rights Watch Canada. In almost four decades of reporting, he has covered many
of the world's conflicts and reported from 10 war zones, from El Salvador to
Beirut and Afghanistan.
One striking
similarity between Canada's first combat mission to Iraq and our long, draining
involvement in the Afghan war is the almost total lack of credible military
intelligence at the outset.
We knew almost nothing
about the Taliban for years, even as we began fighting them, and we know even
less about ISIS now.
It was Ottawa's
abysmal lack of intel in 2005 that allowed us to eagerly lobby NATO to put us
in charge of Kandahar province, the Taliban's home base.
Four frustrating years
later, our small contingent of under 3,000 troops was having limited success in
suppressing escalating Taliban operations there, and a large U.S. Marine surge
was needed to take over the combat lead.
Today, the U.S.-led
coalition that we've joined seems to have a similarly blank intelligence slate
on this latest enemy as it rampages through Syria and parts of Iraq.
One could say we have
a mix of "known unknowns" and even more "unknown unknowns"
to use the convoluted language of former U.S. defence secretary Donald
Rumsfeld, who learned first-hand the costs of faulty intel following the Iraq
invasion in 2003.
This is not an
argument against Canada's newest armed mission. I feel a case can be made that
there is a real risk of ISIS-led genocide in the region that requires outside
intervention.
But if we are going to
engage we should be doing so with enormous care, and regard our government's
claims to be well informed about the combat reality with the deepest suspicion.
Because Canada has no
foreign intelligence agency of its own (and, in fact, is the only G8 country to
refuse even to set up one), we rely largely on what our allies choose to tell
us — and they're not exactly slaves to clarity right now.
Obama's
finger-pointing
Take even the
assessment of ISIS's strength. The U.S. estimates sound like they're arrived at
by CIA analysts throwing darts at a numbers board.
Back in July, ISIS was
estimated at around 10,000 to 12,000 jihadists, but within the past two weeks
estimates have suddenly soared into the 20,000 to 30,000 range.
As if that swing was
not disconcerting enough, the White House and U.S. intelligence community have
been blaming each other for being essentially out to lunch over the entire ISIS
threat.
President Barack Obama
recently claimed that U.S. intelligence downright missed ISIS's growing
strength last winter, when it emerged from its opposition role to Syria's Assad
regime into what some now call the most supremely brutal guerrilla movement in
the world.
To compound that,
Obama noted that his spies also missed the catastrophic decay within the large
and costly Iraq military, which let ISIS capture enough sophisticated, mostly
U.S.-supplied weaponry to threaten the collapse of Iraq itself.
So if we are to
believe Obama, we are in this war today largely thanks to the woeful record of
the key intelligence networks that we must rely on for military success in
future.
Firing back
For its part, the U.S.
intelligence community, which represents the CIA, Pentagon and State
Department, has fired back with news leaks that said the White House overlooked
the obvious warnings it had been handed.
This equally
dispiriting view was buttressed this week when former defence secretary and CIA
director Leon Panetta released his critical memoir, Worthy Fights, which
insists Obama "lost his way" in both Iraq and Syria, leading to the
rise of ISIS.
Even when the
president gets accurate intelligence, Obama "avoids the battle, complains
and misses opportunities," Panetta says.
Panetta may well be
right, but there is still plenty of evidence that military intelligence has
been flawed over the years, to the extent we really don't know what we're
dealing with in this latest war.
The experts seem
frankly baffled as ISIS looks like a cross between an actual army and a
hard-to-count phantom.
When Britain's RAF,
after a month of air surveillance, launched its first five combat mission two
weeks ago it couldn't locate a single ISIS target in Iraq's largely barren
northern landscape.
The equally skilled
Australian air force came up similarly empty on its first missions, although
pilots called off one attack for fear of collateral civilian damage.
"We have seen
ISIS change it tactics," Australia's chief of defence staff Mark Binskin
said this week. "They're moving into built-up areas, and that clearly
brings a different collateral damage issue with it that we have to
manage."
This is going to be a
critical concern for Canadian pilots, too, if intelligence has few answers for
an environment where one wrong aim from 10,000 metres can lead to catastrophic
humanitarian and even international consequences.
Wing and a prayer
In fact, super
intelligence, not just good intelligence, will be needed if we are to avoid
playing into ISIS's hands.
From the beginning of
the ISIS offensive earlier this year, with its self-publicized atrocities, it
seemed clear that the movement was trying to goad Western nations into military
action.
Taking a leaf from
al-Qaeda’s playbook, it counts on such intervention to inflame large Sunni
Muslim populations and cause other terror groups to join its international
jihad.
Coalition partners
know this, but feel they have little choice if they are to save Iraqi and
Kurdish forces to try to stabilize the region.
It is still too early
to assess how well this ISIS strategy is working, though there are some
disturbing signs that the air attacks in Syria are causing a growing Sunni
backlash and driving moderates into the arms of the extremists.
The
"unknowns" are increasing by the week.
In warfare, poor
intelligence can have disastrous consequences by underestimating a foe, but
also by overestimating one, too, and so exaggerating the need for intervention,
which some close observers feel happened in this case.
Today, a confused
coalition seems to be concluding that air power alone cannot suppress such a
well-financed guerrilla army, though whose boots will be on the ground is just
as muddy as everything else.
Since all agree it
will take years to largely destroy ISIS, Canada may find leaving after one
six-month air combat tour as difficult as it was to wrap up its Afghanistan
mission.
In the meantime, our
F-18 pilots will be hoping the coalition can offer up rather more than the wing
and a prayer it seems to be operating on now."
"[McConnell infers Marcy's hijack decoy override signature from the Con
Air movements of Timothy McVeigh] http://www.ufomind.com/area51/
Field McConnell, United States Naval Academy, 1971; Forensic Economist; 30 year airline and 22 year military pilot; 23,000 hours of safety; Tel: 715 307 8222
David Hawkins Tel: 604 542-0891 Forensic Economist; former leader of oil-well blow-out teams; now sponsors Grand Juries in CSI Crime and Safety Investigation
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