Saturday, April 9, 2011

Canadian Governor General Michaëlle Jean - Colonel Russell Williams - Equity of Canada - Thales - Bombardier's FlexJet - Air France Flight 447

To those awake whom it may concern

April 8, 2011

How revolving funds of Canada collided with Air France 447

Abel Danger believes that Crown Agents Sister and former Canadian Governor General Michaëlle Jean, authorized Colonel Russell Williams to use Equity of Canada revolving funds to procure modifications by Thales et al. of Bombardier's FlexJet fleet of aircraft in support of electronic warfare, virtual deception and insurance fraud on commercial airlines.

We also believe that a Bombardier FlexJet plane, allegedly directed by EW specialist, Colonel Russell Williams, transmitted bogus TCAS signals to the flight-control computers of Air France Flight 447 to amplify a Thales pilot-tube error and generate the fatal anti-collision maneuvers of June 1, 2009 and an insurance fraud on Lloyd's of London.

“[TCAS] A traffic collision avoidance system or traffic alert and collision avoidance system (both abbreviated as TCAS) is an aircraft collision avoidance system designed to reduce the incidence of mid-air collisions between aircraft. It monitors the airspace around an aircraft for other aircraft equipped with a corresponding active transponder, independent of air traffic control, and warns pilots of the presence of other transponder-equipped aircraft which may present a threat of mid-air collision (MAC). It is a type of airborne collision avoidance system mandated by the International Civil Aviation Organization to be fitted to all aircraft with a maximum take-off mass (MTOM) of over 5700 kg (12,586 lbs) or authorized to carry more than 19 passengers. Official definition from PANS-ATM (Nov 2007): ACAS / TCAS is an aircraft system based on secondary surveillance radar (SSR) transponder signals which operates independently of ground-based equipment to provide advice to the pilot on potential conflicting aircraft that are equipped with SSR transponders. In modern glass cockpit aircraft, the TCAS display may be integrated in the Navigation Display (ND) or Electronic Horizontal Situation Indicator (EHSI); in older glass cockpit aircraft and those with mechanical instrumentation, such an integrated TCAS display may replace the mechanical Vertical Speed Indicator (which indicates the rate with which the aircraft is descending or climbing).”

“Raising a Pandora's box of ghosts Adam Sage From: The Times April 06, 2011 12:00AM .. WHEN Air France flight 447 took off from Rio de Janeiro bound for Paris in June 2009, it was on a collision course with an equatorial storm over the Atlantic Ocean. On board were 228 passengers of 30 nationalities, including 11-year-old British boy Alexander Bjoroy on his way back to school after a holiday with his family in Brazil. It was a routine overnight flight. But that storm was creating an unusual volume of ice at 10,000m. Either the pilot misjudged the ferocity of the storm or the plane's sensors became clogged with ice that fed false information to the cockpit .. In the aftermath of the disaster, it was understood clearly that the aircraft had encountered a storm and severe turbulence. This much information was transmitted at the time. Soon after, its automatic communications and reporting system showed that the plane's autopilot disengaged. At about 10,000m, with storm winds raging and the plane buffeted on all sides, the crew struggled to control the 230-tonne aircraft. The pilot would have been looking at two computer screens and numerous displays. He had rudder pedals but no traditional hand controls. The A330 is equipped with a small joystick to one side, similar to a computer-games console. The pilot flies using electronic signals .. Soon after the accident, it was theorised that the crew did not know how fast they were travelling. Automatic signals were giving inconsistent readings of the plane's speed. The questions posed were: did the crew or computer mistakenly think there was a danger of stalling? Did they power up, tipping the plane out of control and tearing it apart in the turbulence? Or did a violent updraft simply drive them too close to coffin corner? A bomb or lightning strike were eliminated as possible causes. Instead, human error or incorrect flight data were canvassed. The Rio-Paris route passes through an inter-tropical convergence zone where humid trade winds create storms. Weather maps for that night show numerous cumulonimbus towers rising to at least 15,000m, with thunderstorms and severe turbulence. But it was not exceptional. When flight 447 went out of range of land radar, it meant the pilots were relying on their onboard radar to avoid storms. It's possible the pilots failed to spot the storm ahead. Perhaps they tried to fly above it where, at high altitude, water turns to ice crystals making radar less effective. It seems unlikely to have been pilot error alone, especially since the crew of flight 447 was experienced and the A330 has had an excellent safety record since it came into service in 1993. Nevertheless, it has suffered unnerving incidents. For example, in October 2008, a Qantas A330 was flying at 11,000m over Western Australia when it suddenly pitched nose-down, injuring more than 100 passengers. A report on the incident found one of the plane's computers had "started providing erroneous data". Onboard computers rely on data from external sensors. One that supplies information on airspeed is the pitot. If it gets blocked by ice, it could supply incorrect information to the fly-by-wire system. This is theorised as the most likely reason for the crew of flight 447 to misjudge the plane's actual airspeed. In 2001 a directive for the A330, issued by the US Federal Aviation Administration, said: "Unreliable airspeed may be caused by a radome [radar housing] destruction or obstructed pitots." Perhaps the pitot iced up and confused the aircraft's system. It's clear the plane's autopilot disengaged and system failures followed. Automatic transmissions reported multiple faults. Two minutes later, both flight control computers failed. Back-ups also failed, so something drastic happened to send the plane spinning out of control. Four minutes after the autopilot disengaged, the cabin suddenly depressurised, perhaps with explosive force.”

“Following 25 ACARS Messages were received from the airplane:

2:10:10 - .1/WRN/WN0906010210 221002006 AUTO FLT AP OFF
2:10:16 - .1/WRN/WN0906010210 226201006 AUTO FLT REAC W/S DET FAULT
2:10:23 - .1/WRN/WN0906010210 279100506 F/CTL ALTN LAW
2:10:29 - .1/WRN/WN0906010210 228300206 FLAG ON CAPT PFD SPD LIMIT
2:10:34 #0210/+2.98-30.59
2:10:41 - .1/WRN/WN0906010210 228301206 FLAG ON F/O PFD SPD LIMIT
2:10:47 - .1/WRN/WN0906010210 223002506 AUTO FLT A/THR OFF
2:10:54 - .1/WRN/WN0906010210 344300506 NAV TCAS FAULT
2:11:00 - .1/WRN/WN0906010210 228300106 FLAG ON CAPT PFD FD
2:11:15 - .1/WRN/WN0906010210 228301106 FLAG ON F/O PFD FD
2:11:21 - .1/WRN/WN0906010210 272302006 F/CTL RUD TRV LIM FAULT
2:11:27 - .1/WRN/WN0906010210 279045506 MAINTENANCE STATUS EFCS 2
2:11:42 - .1/WRN/WN0906010210 279045006 MAINTENANCE STATUS EFCS 1
2:11:49 - .1/FLR/FR0906010210 34111506 EFCS2 1,EFCS1,AFS,,,,,PROBE-PITOT 1X2 / 2X3 / 1X3 (9DA),HARD
2:11:55 - .1/FLR/FR0906010210 27933406 EFCS1 X2,EFCS2X,,,,,,FCPC2 (2CE2) /WRG:ADIRU1 BUS ADR1-2 TO FCPC2,HARD
2:12:10 - .1/WRN/WN0906010211 341200106 FLAG ON CAPT PFD FPV
2:12:16 - .1/WRN/WN0906010211 341201106 FLAG ON F/O PFD FPV
2:12:51 - .1/WRN/WN0906010212 341040006 NAV ADR DISAGREE
2:13:8 - .1/FLR/FR0906010211 34220006 ISIS 1,,,,,,,ISIS(22FN-10FC) SPEED OR MACH FUNCTION,HARD
2:13:14 - .1/FLR/FR0906010211 34123406 IR2 1,EFCS1X,IR1,IR3,,,,ADIRU2 (1FP2),HARD
2:13:45 - .1/WRN/WN0906010213 279002506 F/CTL PRIM 1 FAULT
2:13:51 - .1/WRN/WN0906010213 279004006 F/CTL SEC 1 FAULT
2:14:14 - .1/WRN/WN0906010214 341036006 MAINTENANCE STATUS ADR 2
2:14:20 - .1/FLR/FR0906010213 22833406 AFS 1,,,,,,,FMGEC1(1CA1),INTERMITTENT
2:14:26 - .1/WRN/WN0906010214 213100206 ADVISORY CABIN VERTICAL SPEED

The cockpit effect messages mean:

- AUTO FLT AP OFF: The autopilot disconnected without crew intervention
- AUTO FLT REAC W/S DET FAULT: windshear detection is unavailable
- F/CTL ALTN LAW: FBW switched into alternate law (protections lost)
- FLAG ON CAPT PFD SPD LIM and FLAG ON F/O PFD SPD LIM: characteristic speeds (green dot, VLS, ...) lost due to loss of calculating function
- AUTO FLT A/THR OFF: Autothrottle disconnected other than by crew intervention or throttle levers were moved into the idle notch
- NAV TCAS FAULT: TCAS is inoperative, the message has not yet been explained
- FLAG ON CAPT PFD FD and FLAG ON F/O PFD FD: flight director bars have been removed from primary flight displays
- F/CTL RUD TRV LIM FAULT: The rudder limiter value computation is unavailable, the rudder remains limited to the present values until slat extension
- MAINTENANCE STATUS EFCS2 and MAINTENANCE STATUS EFCS1: not brought to the crew attention
- FLAG ON CAPT PFD FPV and FLAG ON F/O PFD FPV: flight path vector displays removed from the primary flight displays, red flags shown instead
- NAV ADR DISAGREE: Computers have rejected one ADR and then detected a disagreement between the remaining ADRs on one of the monitored paramenters.
- F/CTL PRIM 1 FAULT: Primary Flight Controls Computer 1 has stopped functioning either as result of a command or failure
- F/CTL SEC 1 FAULT: Secondary Flight Controls Computer 1 has stopped functioning either as result of a command or failure.
- MAINTENANCE STATUS ADR2: not brought to crew attention
- ADVISORY CABIN VERTICAL SPEED: cabin pressure changes at a rate of 1800 feet/minute or greater for 5 seconds.

Term Explanation
Normal Law: Regular operating mode of the fly by wire (FBW) including all protections.
Alternate Law: Some of the protections in normal law, the regular operating mode, are dropped.
Direct Law: The controls (sidestick) inputs are converted into direct movements of control surfaces without computations or checks.
ADIRU: Air Data and Inertial Reference Unit provides air data (airspeed, altimeter, ...) and positional data (attitude, position) to the instruments
ISIS: Integrated Standby Instrument System is a completely independent, self contained system providing a third independent set of basic instruments (attitude indicator, altimeter, airspeed indicator) to the crew
PRIM 1: Flight Control primary computer #1, three of them monitor each other, one of them controls the control surfaces as master
SEC 1: Flight Control secondary computer #1, each of the two can control all airplane control surfaces in direct law and can become master in case of failure of all primary flight control computers.

02:10Z: Autothrust off
Autopilot off
FBW alternate law
Rudder Travel Limiter Fault
TCAS fault due to antenna fault
Flight Envelope Computation warning
All pitot static ports lost
02:11Z: Failure of all three ADIRUs
Failure of gyros of ISIS (attitude information lost)
02:12Z: ADIRUs Air Data disagree
02:13Z: Flight Management, Guidance and Envelope Computer fault
PRIM 1 fault
SEC 1 fault
02:14Z: Cabin Pressure Controller fault (cabin vertical speed)”

“You see Watson but you do not observe!”

Abel Danger

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